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I. INTRODUCTION
Many in the legal community expressed surprise when the judge
in the well-publicized Florida patricide trial of Derek and Alex King
appointed a mediator to negotiate punishment for the boys after re-
jecting the jury verdicts of second degree murder against them both.1
Yet the judge's action was far from unprecedented. Mediating crimi-
nal cases is no longer a vague concept, limited to only juveniles, non-
serious adult criminal cases, and so-called "victim-offender" programs.
From major murders to average possession cases, an increasing num-
ber of judges and attorneys are turning to mediation as a method of
resolving felony cases.2 While non-victim-offender criminal mediations
are still relatively rare,' what is sometimes called "case-management"
or "voluntary settlement conference" ("VSC")' mediation5 is begin-
ning to take hold in the criminal context.
1. See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Cahill, Punishment By Mutual Agreement: Law-
yer for Boy Accused in Dad's Murder Doubts Mediation Will Work, 41 A.B.A. J. E-REPoRT
1, Oct. 25, 2002; Brett Norman, Mediation to Chart Unfamiliar Course, PENSACOLA NEWS
J., Oct. 18, 2002, at 2A.
2. See Marie R. Volpe, Promises and Challenges: ADR in the Criminal Justice
System, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2000, at 4-5.
3. Id. (noting that despite the increased use and acceptance of ADR in the civil
arena over the past thirty years, its effective use in the criminal justice milieu has been
simultaneously overlooked and controversial); see also Jennifer Smith, Scrapping the
Plea-Bargain: Mandatory Mediation of Criminal Cases Would Further Justice, at a Lower
Social Cost, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2000, at 19 (noting that ADR is rarely used in major
criminal cases involving adults); KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION IN A NUTSHELL 282-
83 (2003) ("The use of mediation to assist prosecutors and defense lawyers in the plea
bargaining process has not been very common.'); Cahill, supra note 1, at 1.
4. See H. WARREN KNIGHT ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ch. 3-E (2002). The guide distinguishes between "classic" mediation
and voluntary settlement conference by providing that:
A voluntary settlement conference (VSC) is similar to the classic mediation
format .... However, unlike classic mediation, there is no concerted attempt
to get the parties to focus on their respective interests, attack the underlying
problem, and come up with their own solution. Instead, a VSC is more fo-
cused on settlement of litigation.
Id; see also JONATHAN M. HYMAN ET AL., CIVIL SE'IrLEMENT STYLES OF NEGOTIATION IN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 40-55 (1997) (discussing judicial settlement actions); Milton Heu-
mann & Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods in
New Jersey: "You Can't Always Get What You Want", 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 253
(1997) (providing an in-depth look into negotiation styles and noting the wide spread use
of positional bargaining).
5. While I maintain that mediation and settlement conferencing are distinct
forms of ADR, Maureen Laflin, Preserving the Integrity of Mediation Through the Adop-
tion of Ethical Rules for Lawyer-Mediators, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
479, 491-99 (2000), I also recognize that many ADR practitioners use the terms inter-
changeably. For ease of understanding and consistency with the broad definition of me-
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Yet even modest growth in the frequency of criminal mediations
triggers controversy. Criminal mediation raises concerns largely un-
known in the civil context, concerns that stem from three critical dif-
ferences between criminal and civil mediation-what is at stake, who
are the stakeholders, and who is the mediator. In civil mediation, the
issue usually centers around money. In contrast, the greatest of inter-
ests-life and liberty-are at stake in criminal mediation. Moreover,
the identity of the principal stakeholders in civil cases is usually
straightforward. While complex civil mediations often include secon-
dary interested parties, the principal stakeholders are the plaintiff(s)
and defendant(s) to the underlying action. The identity of the stake-
holders becomes more complicated in the criminal arena as the prose-
cutor brings the charges on behalf of the government or "the people."
Thus, juxtaposed to the defendant in a criminal mediation as a prin-
cipal stakeholder is the government, not the actual victim. Yet the
victim's interest in the matter provides good reason to consider him or
her a stakeholder with something more than a secondary interest.
Criminal mediation thus inherently takes the form of a multi-party,
multi-interest process. Finally, the identity of the mediator differs be-
tween civil and criminal mediation. Civil mediations usually are con-
ducted by trained mediators, while most criminal mediations of the
case-management form are handled by judges who may or may not
have training, experience, or even any real understanding of media-
tion practice.
These differences between civil and criminal mediation raise con-
cerns that for many are of such weight as to militate against any use
of mediation in the criminal arena. Victims' rights advocates caution
that mediation processes that do not include victims may undermine
the attainment of resolution or closure that so many victims need.
Experienced, trained civil mediators look with puzzlement and con-
cern at the casual, almost cavalier attitude many criminal court
judges take toward how easy they imagine it to be to dye the hue of
their robes from those of adjudicators to mediators. And while many
prosecutors fear losing control and the competitive edge they usually
enjoy in the criminal process,6 defense attorneys worry that criminal
mediation portends widespread waiver of the constitutional rights of
the accused.
diation set forth in the Uniform Mediation Act, I will use the term "mediation" when re-
ferring to the voluntary settlement process many judges are using in the criminal arena.
6. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36
U. CHI. L. REV. 52, 52-53 (1968) (stating that a prosecutor has four roles: (1) acts as an
administrator, (2) acts as an advocate, (3) acts a as a judge, and (4) acts as a legislator).
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Concerns about criminal mediation thus mark every participant
in the process. Nevertheless, criminal mediation is becoming more
and more common. In the State of Idaho, for example, some trial court
judges strongly encourage mediation, sometimes treating it as "a pre-
requisite to trial" for many cases on their criminal calendars.' As of
spring 2001, one Idaho trial judge had personally mediated seven
homicides, with six resulting in plea agreements, in addition to cases
involving rape and conspiracy to commit murder.'
Criminal mediation is thus an emerging reality, for better or
worse. In hopes that reflective consideration of the process as it is
emerging will help produce a better reality, this article explores sev-
eral of the central questions and concerns that attend criminal media-
tion. Part II begins with an examination of the distinctiveness of
criminal mediation-what is mediation, and how the specific, emer-
gent form of criminal mediation under review, case-management or
voluntary settlement conference mediation, is different from the more
restorative models such as Victim Offender Mediation. Part III turns
to the five principal concerns arising under criminal mediation: (1)
Who are the stakeholders, and should victims be invited to the table;
(2) Whether training in mediation practice, regarded as essential for
civil mediators, is equally requisite for criminal mediators as a check
on the coercive nature of criminal mediations; (3) What case-
management criminal mediation offers the defendants and whether it
threatens to effectively (and involuntarily) waive the constitutional
rights of the accused; (4) How to avoid prosecutorial resistance to
criminal mediation; and (5) Whether current mediation privilege rules
adequately protect mediation communications in the criminal context.
Despite these concerns, Part III acknowledges there are several ad-
vantages to criminal mediation and offers several suggestions to en-
sure that the process does develop into a fruitful and beneficial real-
ity. Specifically, I suggest that states and members of the ADR com-
munity interested in pursuing case-management criminal mediation
proceed with caution. The process which has grown organically needs
to ensure safeguards for all concerned, particularly the criminal de-
fendants who participate in civil and criminal mediations with the be-
lief that all communications are confidential. States need to adopt
court rules to ensure that the mediation privilege rules protect the
confidentiality of mediation communications that occur. Advocates of
the case-management model of criminal mediation should take time
7. Conversation with various participants of the "Mediating the Criminal Case"
seminar, Northwest Institute for Dispute Resolution, University of Idaho College of Law
(May 2003) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Seminar].
8. Cathy Derden, Criminal Mediation, ADVOCATE, Feb. 2002, at 25.
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to reflect upon and learn from the experiences of those active in civil
mediation and restorative programs.
II. DISTINCTIVENESS OF CRIMINAL MEDIATION
A. What is Mediation?
There is no shortage of definitions for mediation, all with differ-
ent twists and angles. The definitions contain two common elements:
(1) a third-party neutral who helps facilitate a dispute, but who (2)
lacks power to dictate the resolution." The limited power of the third-
party neutral over the outcome is a product of the central emphasis in
mediation to ensure the parties' self-determination."0 Beyond these
two commonalities, definitions of mediation separate into a broad
spectrum. Most of the separation involves the role of the mediator and
the role of evaluation in the process.
In the mid-1990s, Professor Leonard L. Riskin sought to provide
definitional clarification to some of the ambiguity surrounding media-
tion. Creating what he called the "mediator grid,"" Riskin identified
two opposing pair of mediation characteristics--evaluative vs. facilita-
tive, and narrow vs. broad. 2 Defining mediation as "a process in
which an impartial third party, who lacks authority to impose a solu-
tion, helps others resolve a dispute or plan a transaction,' '13 Riskin
combined the pairs of characteristics into four basic mediation ap-
proaches-evaluative-narrow, facilitative-narrow, evaluative-broad,
and evaluative-narrow. 4 He recognized that while each mediator
comes with a predominant orientation employing certain strategies
9. Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-And of Mediator
Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501, 508 (1997).
10. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-
Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REv. 1, 23-27 (2001) (stating that self-determination gave the parties the opportunity to
create options for settlement and to control the final outcome of the mediation).
11. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediator Orientations, Strategies and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 13 (1996) ("I hope to fa-
cilitate discussions and to help clarify arguments by providing a system for categorizing
and understanding approaches to mediation.').
12. Id. Riskin acknowledges that his own orientation is as a broad facilitative
mediator and that this approach is not universal. He believes the time for narrow defini-
tions are gone. Citing Ludwig Wittgenstein, Riskin writes, "Usage determines meaning."
Id. at 13 n.18.
13. Id. at8.
14. Id. at 26-34.
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more frequently than others, many mediators move along the con-
tinua and among the quadrants. 5
Riskin noted that the greatest disagreement and confusion in
mediation practice is over whether a mediator should take an evalua-
tive approach."6 He characterized an evaluative mediator as one who
"assumes that the participants want and need her to provide some
guidance as to the appropriate grounds for the settlement.' 7 Riskin
noted that "the parties should understand that once they involve a
third party, and allow that 'neutral' to give an opinion on the merits,
that determination will almost always have a powerful impact on all
further negotiations." 8 By contrast, the facilitative mediator "assumes
that the parties are intelligent, able to work with their counterparts,
and capable of understanding their situations better than the media-
tor and, perhaps, better than their lawyers."'9 As noted by Riskin and
others, the concerns over the evaluative approach primarily focus on
the parties' potential loss of self-determination 0 and the mediator's
loss of impartiality.2'
A number of commentators have criticized Riskin and his "grid"
framework. 2  Some have argued strenuously that evaluation is not
mediation.23 Others have taken a cautionary approach to evaluation,
maintaining that to be effective, a mediator may well need to evaluate
sometimes. 2 Finally, some commentators have advocated evaluation,
15. Id. at 35-36.
16. See id. at9.
17. Id. at 24.
18. Id. at 44.
19. Id. at 24.
20. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 10, at 49-52; Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag
Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate or Advise?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 672
(1997) (arguing that if the parties want evaluation, then the principle of self-
determination should govern and allow evaluation); Riskin, supra note 11, at 45.
21. Moberly, supra note 20, at 671.
22. For a summary of the debate, see, e.g., Chris Guthrie, The Lawyer's Philoso-
phical Map and the Disputant's Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative Mediation
and Lawyering, 6 HARv. NEGoT. L. REV. 145, 146-54 (2001), and Welsh, supra note 10, at
27-30.
23. See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The
Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998) [hereinafter Kovach & Love,
Mapping Mediation]; Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (1997); Kimberlee K Kovach & Lela P. Love,
"Evaluative"Mediation is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (1996).
24. James Alfini & Gerald S. Clay, Should Lawyer-Mediators Be Prohibited from
Providing Legal Advice or Evaluations?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1994, at 8. Gerald S.
Clay, an attorney mediator, argues that "[elffective mediation almost always requires
some analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each party's position should the dispute
be arbitrated or litigated." Id. Marjorie Corman Aaron, executive director of the Program
on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, maintains that situations do exist in which the
careful and thoughtful use of mediator evaluation can serve the parties. Marjorie Corman
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arguing that mediators should use evaluation at times, so long as they
do so with restraint and only at the parties' request or insistence.25
Nearly ten years since publication of his influential essay, Riskin,
noting certain deficiencies with his original grid, has now revised its
structure and proposes using the terms "directive" and "elicitive" in
place of "evaluative" and "facilitative. 16 He also advocates a new sys-
tem which focuses on the "influence that each participant exerts or
hopes or plans to exert."2'7 The new system looks both at the parties'
predisposition regarding influence as well as their actual influence.28
Beyond Riskin and his critics, definitions of mediation have been
offered by several other scholars,29 as well as by court rules3 and
Aaron, ADR Toolbox: The Highwire Act of Evaluation, 14 ALTERNATIvES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 62, 62--64 (1996). The mediator's evaluation should not be the final word, but
should provide "a range within which an intelligent, neutral, fair-minded person would
find it reasonable for the parties to settle." Id. at 64; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation
the Practice of Law?, 14 ALTERNATIVES To HIGH COST OF LITIG. 57, 61 (1996) ("Complex
mediation these days often involves legal questions and mediator prediction or evaluation
of the legal merits or 'likely outcomes' of cases. Wouldn't you want a mediator with legal
expertise if you were involved in an important caseT' She goes on to say, "Just because a
mediator has a law degree-or even an up-to-date license to practice-does not mean that
he or she will give accurate legal advice, prediction or evaluation.'.
25. See John Feerick et al., Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 95, 101-05. Professor Leonard Riskin com-
mented that "if the parties intelligently decide that they want the narrow evaluative me-
diation, .... the mediator ought to evaluate and it is ethical .... Id. He further stated
that "evaluation can enhance self-determination." Id; see also Donald T. Weckstein, In
Praise of Party Empowerment-And of Mediator Activism, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 501,
504, 552 (1997) (arguing that evaluation at certain times can enhance rather than deny
party self-determination). Furthermore, Weckstein argues that "when consistent with the
parties' expectations and the mediator's qualifications, activist intervention by the media-
tor should be encouraged rather than condemned." Id. In addition, he argues for the use
of evaluations "only after other more facilitative measures have failed to break an im-
passe." Id; see also Samuel J. Imperati, Mediator Practice Models: The Intersection of Eth-
ics and Stylistic Practices in Mediation, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 703, 743 (1997) (advocat-
ing for the development of a "code that encourages the parties to pick the mediation
model that works for them').
26. Leonard L. Riskin, Who Decides What? Rethinking the Grid of Mediator Ori-
entations, DiSP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2003, at 22, 24.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Id. at 25 (explaining that his new problem definition grid includes "partici-
pants' predispositions about both what the problem definition should be and about who
should influence its development," and that "[o]ther potential grids could deal with actual
influence... during.., the mediation process'.
29. See, e.g., John D. Feerick, Toward Uniform Standards of Conduct for Media-
tors, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 455, 478 app. A (1997). The Model Standards define mediation as:
[A] process in which an impartial third party-a mediator-facilitates the
resolution of a dispute by promoting voluntary agreement (or 'self-
determination') by the parties to the dispute. A mediator facilitates communi-
cations, promoting understanding, focuses the parties on their interests, and
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cases."' Throughout and central to the definitional debate has been
concern over whether certain evaluative processes are truly media-
tion.3" The Uniform Mediation Act ("UMA") weighed in on the topic by
adopting a broad definition. The UMA defines mediation as "a process
in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation be-
tween parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement re-
garding their dispute.' 3 As reflected in the Reporter's Notes,
[t]he emphasis on negotiation in this definition is intended to
exclude adjudicative processes, such as arbitration and fact-
finding, as well as counseling. It was not intended to distin-
guish among styles or approaches to mediation .... The use of
seeks creative problem-solving to enable the parties to reach their own
agreement.
Id.
30. States which have adopted rules for mediation generally define the term.
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure define mediation as:
[T]he process by which a neutral mediator appointed by the Court or agreed
to by the parties assists the parties in reaching a mutually acceptable agree-
ment. The role of the mediator is to aid the parties in identifying the issues,
reducing misunderstandings, clarifying priorities, exploring areas of com-
promise and finding points of agreement. An agreement reached by the par-
ties is to be based on the decision of the parties, and not the decisions of the
mediator...."
IDAHO. R. Civ. P. 16(k). The Idaho Federal District Court defines mediation as:
[A] process in which an impartial third party (the 'mediator') facilitates com-
munication between parties and assists them in their negotiations (e.g., by
clarifying underlying interests) as they attempt to reach an agreed settle-
ment of their dispute. In some mediations, the neutral may spend some time
meeting separately and privately with one party or side at a time. Whether a
settlement results from mediation and the nature and extent of the settle-
ment are within the sole control of the parties."
U.S. DIST. Cr. D. IDAHO L. Civ. R. 16.5.
31. Definitions from court cases have a law-related spin on them. For example,
Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah 1995), involved a motion to dis-
qualify an attorney from representing one of the parties based on the attorney's previous
role as a mediator in a substantially factually related matter. The court defined a media-
tor for purposes of the case as "an attorney who agrees to assist parties in settling a legal
dispute, and in the course of assisting those parties undertakes a confidential relationship
with them." Id. at 1493.
32. See Laflin, supra note 5, at 491-93; Riskin, supra note 11, at 40; Kovach &
Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 23, at 79.
33. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2003), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/UMA2001.htm (last visited March 27, 2004) [hereinafter UMA].
The UMA is the result of a historic collaboration between the ABA Dispute Resolution
Section and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL"). In August 2001, the NCCUSL adopted the UMA, and in February 2002 the
ABA House of Delegates endorsed it.
[Vol. 40
2004] REMARKS ON CASE-MANAGEMENT CRIMINAL 579
MEDIATION
the word 'facilitation' is not intended to express a preference
with regard to approaches of mediation. The Drafters recog-
nize approaches to mediation will vary widely.3
Thus the pressing debate over the last several years among me-
diation scholars and practitioners over the definition of mediation has
to this point resulted in no real consensus. Rather, as reflected in the
UMA's definition and the reporter's comments, an all-inclusive ap-
proach has won out.
3 5
B. Two Models of Criminal Mediation
Two significant mediation models--the restorative justice model
and the case-management evaluative model-have emerged in the
context of criminal cases, each with a different focus, different phi-
losophies, and a different bargaining scheme. Most of what has been
written about mediation in the criminal arena discusses restorative
justice programs such as victim offender programs ("VOM").1 Just as
34. UMA, supra note 33, § 2 cmt. 1.
35. While the all-inclusive definition reflects the common usage of the term, it
does in my mind distort the view of mediation as a true alternative to the adjudicative
system of dispute resolution. As I argued in a prior article:
The ADR spectrum... must not be conceived as a number line where each
form of ADR occupies a clearly marked independent position. Rather, it forms
a spectrum along the lines of a color spectrum, such that every ADR method
can be understood only in relation to the others into which it blends and
fades.
Laflin, supra note 5, at 492. At some point however, the colors stop blending, and the
process stops being mediation.
36. See, e.g., Andre R. Imbrogno, Recent Development: State v. Tolias, 14 OHIo
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 699, 705-06 (1999) (stating that mediation has been used in the
criminal arena in two mediation contexts-victim-offender mediation programs and
community dispute resolution programs which remove minor disputes from the courts);
Sheila D. Porter & David B. Ells, Mediation Meets the Criminal Justice System, 23 COLO.
LAW. 2521 (1994) (discussing the victim-offender mediation models and encouraging their
growth and study); Mark S. Umbreit & Jean Greenwood, National Survey of Victim-
Offender Mediation Programs in the United States, 16 MEDIATION Q. 235, 250 (1999)
(writing on the number of victim-offender mediation programs that exist in the United
States); Marty Price, Crime and Punishment: Can Mediation Produce Restorative Justice
for Victims and Offenders?, Victim-Offender Reconciliation Program Info. & Resource
Center, at http://www.vorp.com/articles/crime.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (advocat-
ing a restorative approach to justice); Paul R. Rice, Mediation and Arbitration as a Civil
Alternative to the Criminal Justice System-An Overview and Legal Analysis, 29 AM. U.
L. REV. 17 (1979) (indicating criminal mediation programs include the victim and the ac-
cused in order to arrive at a mutually agreeable solution to their dispute); Adina Levine,
A Dark State of Criminal Affairs: ADR Can Restore Justice to the Criminal "Justice" Sys-
tem, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 369 (2003) (arguing for the use of mediation in the
plea setting to reduce or eliminate the racism inherent in the criminal justice process).
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a continuum exists in the ADR spectrum, one also exists between re-
storative and retributive justice. 7 The role of healing and the influ-
ence of the victim fades as one spans the spectrum from restorative
justice to retributive justice.
VOM programs historically have focused on a restorative justice
approach, 38 while traditional criminal law focuses on retributive jus-
tice." Under the retributive model, crime is a violation of the laws of
the state,40 and the state is viewed as the victim, to whom the offender
owes an obligation to suffer punishment. 41 Retributive justice "is de-
signed to answer the questions of, 'what laws were broken, who broke
them and how should the law-breaker be punished."'42 In contrast, the
restorative model sees the actual victim of the crime as the party to be
made whole, and the offender is held accountable by taking responsi-
bility for his or her actions.4 3 The goal of restorative justice is "to re-
pair the harm that crime causes."
1. Restorative Justice Model: Victim Offender Mediation
The restorative justice model is "relationship-driven," focusing on
healing" and attaining closure.46 It demands accountability and obli-
37. Mary Ellen Reimund, Is Restorative Justice on a Collision Course with the
Constitution?, 4 APPALACHIAN J.L. _ (forthcoming 2004) (citing Howard Zehr, Restora-
tive Justice: The Concept, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 1997, at 68, 70).
38. See Price, supra note 36 ("Restorative justice sees crime as a violation of
human relationships rather than the breaking of laws. Crimes are committed against vic-
tims and communities, rather than against a government.") (emphasis omitted). For a
history of restorative justice, see Reimund, supra note 37, at 8-10, and Mary Ellen Re-
imund, Mediation in Criminal Justice: A Restorative Approach, ADVOCATE, May 2003, at
22.
39. Katherine L. Joseph, Victim-Offender Mediation: What Social & Political
Factors Will Affect Its Development?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 207, 216 (1996).
40. See Reimund, supra note 38; HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENS: A NEW Focus
FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 181 (1990) (Crime is viewed as a violation against the state, "de-
fined by law breaking and guilt. Justice determines blame and administers pain in a con-
test between the offender and the state by systemic rules.').
41. Joseph, supra note 39, at 216.
42. Price, supra note 36.
43. 1d; see also Mark S. Umbreit et al., The Impact of Victim-Offender Media-
tion: Two Decades of Research, 65 FED. PROBATION 29, 29 (2001) (stating that the recon-
ciliation process generally takes place through face-to-face meetings between the offender
and the victim, often referred to as "conferencing" or "dialogue," at which the offender is
made to understand the effects of his conduct and given an opportunity to offer personal
atonement to those he or she has directly harmed).
44. Reimund, supra note 37, at 7 (citing Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave, In-
troduction: Restorative Justice and the International Juvenile Justice Crisis, in
RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 4 (Gordon Bazel-
more & Lode Walgrave eds. 1999)).
45. Id. (advocating that we "move as far as we can toward a process that puts
victims, offenders and members of the affected community-and their respective needs
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gations. The underlying premise is that crime is a violation of people
and relationships. "It creates obligations to make things right. Re-
storative justice involves the victim, the offender, and the community
in search for solutions which promote repair, reconciliation, and reas-
surance."4 7 As one commentator has written, "Ir]estorative justice as a
framework for dealing with crime and its aftermath offers great pos-
sibilities for changing the focus of criminal justice from simply incar-
cerating wrongdoers to focusing on the needs of victims, on repairing
communities and on holding offenders accountable in meaningful
ways.'"48 The goal of restorative programs is thus to resolve criminal
conflicts in ways that both the victim and the offender accept as fair.
41
"Forgiveness" is a central and contentious concept among re-
storative justice scholars. Forgiveness does not occur in every restora-
tive process, though victim offender programs do provide an opportu-
nity for such healing to occur.5 0 When forgiveness is given it brings
the potential for closure, allowing both victim and wrongdoer to move
forward with their lives. While forgiveness is a state of mind held by
the victim, it has aspects directed inwardly toward the victim and out-
wardly to the wrongdoer. From the inward standpoint of the victim's
rights and self-interest, forgiveness requires a "willingness to aban-
don one's right to resentment, negative judgment, and indifferent be-
havior toward one who unjustly injures us ....
Directed outwardly toward the wrongdoer, forgiveness begins
when the victim starts to see the wrongdoer differently, specifically,
and roles-at the center of our search for a justice that heals'); see also Porter & Ells, su-
pra note 36, at 2521 (suggesting that VOM "offers an opportunity to create a balance be-
tween what is legally right and what is morally or ethically right'); Mark William Bak-
ker, Repairing the Breach and Reconciling the Discordant: Mediation in the Criminal Jus-
tice System, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1486 (1994) ("Advocates contend that mediation is a ho-
listic process; by focusing on the reparation of relationships rather than concentrating on
individual rights, mediation contains community building aspects.!).
46. Umbreit et al., supra note 43, at 30.
47. Bakker, supra note 45, at 1515.
48. David M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System: If It Belongs,
Then Why Is It So Hard to Find?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1663, 1664 (2000).
49. See Bakker, supra 45, at 1485.
50. Price, supra note 36 ("The primary focus is upon healing and closure ....
Forgiveness is a process, not a goal. It must occur according to the victim's own timing, if
at all. For some victims, forgiveness may never be appropriate."); Deborah L. Levi, The
Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1200-04 (1997) (discussing the role
of apology in criminal matters).
51. Lerman, supra note 48, at 1663 (citing Robert D. Enright, The Psychology of
Interpersonal Forgiveness (1995) (Paper presented at National Conference on Forgive-
ness, Madison, Wisconsin), quoted in WALTER DICKEY, FORGWVENESS AND CRIME: THE
POSSIBILITIES OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, EXPLORING FORGIVENESS (Robert D. Enright &
Joanna North eds., 1998)).
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when the victim develops an empathetic view that takes in more of
the wrongdoer than his or her crime. This aspect of forgiveness consti-
tutes a form of understanding-indeed, in the moral sense, quite an
elevated form of understanding that involves seeing the wrongdoer as
a whole (though imperfect) moral being, one whose wrongful act is an
instance wedged in a life with a past and a future not without pros-
pects and possibilities. It is this outward aspect of forgiveness that is
the more difficult to attain and the true source of potential for closure,
for it is here that forgiveness becomes forward-looking and directed
toward acts of reconciliation.
Nevertheless, some in the restorative community argue that
seeking forgiveness asks too much of the victim," suggesting that
some lesser degree of understanding be encouraged. 53 But any degree
of understanding, in the restorative justice framework, is premised on
an admission of wrongdoing," an admission thought to benefit both
sides. As one author has noted, "[w]hat many victims want most from
offenders [is] true remorse, and an acknowledgment of responsibility
for the harm they've done .... ,Is Yet many offenders want something
similar, their victims to "listen" to them."
VOM programs are the most common form of restorative crimi-
nal mediations.57 VOM programs personalize the consequences of
crime as both offender and victim come together in a controlled, safe
setting to "share the pain of being victimized and to answer questions
about why and how.'""
VOM programs provide a valuable avenue for addressing the ex-
ploding American prison population. Prisons have become one of the
nation's fastest growing industries with some state penal budgets ex-
ceeding their education budgets. Nevertheless, the criminal justice
52. Robert B. Coates & John Gehm, Victim Meets Offender: An Evaluation of
Victim-Offender Reconciliation Programs 9 (1985) (quoting one victim as saying, "it's like
being hit by a car and having to get out and help the other driver when all you were doing
was minding your own business.').
53. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A
Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1280-81 (1994).
54. Id. at 1280.
55. Id. at 1281.
56. Coates & Gehm, supra note 52, at 6.
57. Brown, supra note 53, at 1258 (citing PACT INSTrrrTE OF JUSTICE, VICTIM-
OFFENDER RECONCILIATION & MEDIATION PROGRAM DIRECTORY 1 (Harriet Fagan & John
Gehm eds., 1993), stating that in 1993, Victim-Offender Mediation (VOM) programs in
the United States handled 16,500 cases); Umbreit et al., supra note 43, at 29 (stating that
as of 2001, there were 1,300 VOM programs in 18 countries).
58. Umbreit et al., supra note 43, at 30.
59. Price, supra note 36.
[Vol. 40
2004] REMARKS ON CASE-MANAGEMENT CRIMINAL 583
MEDIATION
system in the country is in shambles with high recidivism rates,60 and
ever rising incarceration numbers.61 As one commentator has noted,
"[tihe criminal justice system has the wrong focus. Its major interest
lies in incarcerating someone convicted of a particular crime. The sys-
tem does not adequately deal with a major consequence of crime: the
destruction of trust between people that results from crime."62 Our
current "get tough on crime" policy burdens the government with the
high cost of housing inmates63 and is overburdening the courts." Some
argue that VOM provides one option to this national culture of re-
tributive incarceration, an option that may lead to lower recidivism
rates.6 5
60. Bakker, supra note 45, at 1492 (indicating that studies suggest that people
who are or have been incarcerated are 41% more likely to commit some form of crime
that will land them back in jail within 3 years of their release).
61. Scott Shane, Locked Up in Land of the Free Inmates: The United States has
Surpassed Russia as the Nation with the Highest Percentage of Citizens Behind Bars,
BALT. SUN, June 2, 2003, at 2A (stating that the United States has the highest prison
population of any developed or developing countries). More than two million men, women
and children in the U.S. are imprisoned and more people are in prison in Maryland (ap-
proximately 35,200) than in the country of Canada (approximately 31,600) even though
Canada's population is six times that of Maryland). Id.
62. Lerman, supra note 48, at 1664.
63. It costs approximately $20,000-$25,000 a year to house one inmate. Inter-
view with Ryan S. King, The Sentencing Project (March 2004) (notes on file with author).
The average cost of housing an inmate in the state system in 1996 was $20,100 and in the
federal system it was $25,327. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DEPT. OF JUSTICE BUDGET
AUTHORITY BY AGENCY FOR 2003 REQUEST 117-19, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
jmd/budgetsummarybtd/1975_200212002/html/pagell7-119.htm (last visited Mar. 29,
2004). The poverty level for a single person under 65 in 2002 meant living on $9,359 or
less. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002, available at
www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty.html (last visited on Jan. 25, 2004). As of December.
31, 2002, there were over two million people held in federal, state, or local jails in the
United States. Media Awareness Project, US HI: Editorial: Prison Costs Skyrocket (2003),
at www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v03/nl146/ a08.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
64. Bakker, supra note 45, at 1492. Between 1994 and 2000, the number of de-
fendants charged in criminal cases filed in U.S. district courts increased 34%, from 62,237
to 83,251. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING (2000),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bs/pub/pdf/fccpO0.pdf (last visited March 14, 2004).
During 2000 criminal cases involving 76,952 defendants were concluded in U.S. district
courts. Id. Of these, 89% were convicted. Id. In state courts, criminal filings increased
30% from 1984-1993, felony caseloads have increased 70% since 1984 (these cases require
the most judicial attention), and the number of those convicted of drug offenses and sen-
tenced to prison has increased over 500 % since 1983. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS: EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE COURTS (1995),
available at http://www.ncsconline.org(D_Research/csp/Highlights/vollnol.pdf (last vis-
ited March 14, 2004).
65. Bakker, supra note 45, at 1503 (noting that restorative justice advocates
claim that involving the victim and the offender in the resolution of the conflict will re-
duce the high recidivism rate. Studies suggest that people who are or have been incarcer-
IDAHO LAW REVIEW
VOM differs from case-management criminal mediation in sev-
eral significant ways. In VOM, the only party compelled to attend is
the offender.16 The victim's participation is voluntary, though many
victims are willing to meet with the offender. 7 Victims frequently
want the opportunity to ask questions of the offender, vent about the
incident, or achieve closure.6 8 They often want to know why or how
they were chosen, i.e., whether they were a random victim or for some
reason personally selected. Many victims desire the opportunity to tell
the offender how the crime impacted their life, a process often in-
strumental to obtaining some degree of closure and restoration. 9 The
actual victim-offender process is fluid and highly self-selective.7" VOM
programs seek to bring the victim and the perpetrator together with a
neutral third person7 in an attempt to reach a mutually agreeable
resolution of the offense." Three models of VOM have developed-
church-based (reflecting VOM's roots in Christian theory), commu-
nity-based, and system-based.73 One central theme for each is that
"crime involves injury to both victims and the community. The pri-
mary emphasis, however, is the wrong done to the person, as opposed
to that done to the state."4
The type of crime at issue significantly determines the appropri-
ateness of VOM. More than half of the United States restorative jus-
tice programs require the offender to plead or admit guilt before par-
ticipating in the program.75 Moreover, in many VOM programs, the of-
fenders' attorneys are not invited to attend. 6 These practices trigger
ated are 41% more likely to commit some form of crime that will land them back in jail
within three years of their release).
66. Mark S. Umbreit, Mediation of Victim Offender Conflict, 1988 J. DISP.
RESOL. 85, 89 (1988) (stating that in actual practice the offender must attend).
67. KOVACH, supra note 3, at 284.
68. Id. at 283.
69. Id. at 283 ("The foundation for victim-offender mediation is that the offend-
ers, particularly first and second time offenders, are often remorseful about having in-
jured someone and could benefit from an opportunity to apologize and make restitution.").
70. Umbreit et al., supra note 43, at 30 (noting in one study, forty to sixty per-
cent of those offered the opportunity to participate in VOM declined).
71. See Teresa V. Carey, Credentialing for Mediators-To Be or Not To Be?, 30
U.S.F. L. REV. 635, 637 (1996) ("A substantial proportion of local mediation services are
dispensed by volunteers, usually under the umbrella of a local community organization.).
72. Price, supra note 36.
73. See Terenia Urban Guill, Comment, A Framework for Understanding and
Using ADR, 71 TuL. L. REV. 1313, 1328 (1997); Joseph, supra note 39, at 209; Porter &
Ells, supra note 36, at 2522.
74. Bakker, supra note 45, at 1515-16.
75. Umbreit & Greenwood, supra note 36, at 239.
76. Brown, supra note 53, at 1287-91; Guill, supra note 73, at 1330 (arguing
that the contention that the right to counsel is not implicated in VOM programs as such
"is not a critical stage in the proceeding smacks of disingenuousness").
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one persistent criticism of VOM programs-the lack of procedural
protections to scrutinize and ensure that the rights of the offender are
protected."
It is not surprising, then, that while VOM is becoming fairly
commonplace in juvenile and misdemeanor matters,7 8 it remains un-
common for violent crimes. 79 Nevertheless, a few programs do focus on
felony cases.8° Some commentators have argued that VOM is well-
suited for simple rape cases." Others have highlighted crimes of ad-
diction, maintaining they are better resolved in an alternative dispute
resolution program than through the "retributive-minded criminal
courts" of our current criminal justice system.8 2 Yet others have
stressed that mediating violent cases necessitates more pre-
conference work.83 Nevertheless, advocates of a restorative approach
77. Brown, supra note 53, at 1271. (The offender's rights "receive far greater
scrutiny than the offender's decision to participate in VOM, which may not be counseled
or reviewed by a court at all. The decision to leave the justice system and enter VOM
should require no less rigorous a judicial review to insure that the offender's decision is
informed and voluntary.).
78. Umbreit et al., supra note 43, at 33 ("VOM is often used as a 'front-end' di-
versionary option often working with 'less serious' cases.... [Tihe largest VOM programs
in the United States, come receiving over 1,000 referrals a year, serve as a diversion of
young offenders with little or no prior court involvement from formal processing in the
juvenile court.'); Bakker, supra note 45, at 1485 ('The most common referrals involve
property crimes such as vandalism and burglary, yet some programs have applied VORP
techniques to more violent offenses, such as negligent homicide, armed robbery, and
rape.").
79. See, e.g., Reimund, supra note 37, at 11 ("About two-thirds of the cases han-
dled by [VOM] programs are misdemeanor crimes while about one-third of the cases are
felonies. Most programs in the United States, 81 percent, work with juveniles.'); Price,
supra note 36 ("Most victim-offender mediation programs do their work only with juvenile
offenders and only with nonviolent offenses. The mediation of severely violent crimes is
not commonplace.').
80. Brown, supra note 53, at 1262.
81. See Deborah Gartzke Goolsby, Using Mediation in Cases of Simple Rape, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1183 (1990) (advocating the use of victim offender mediation in
simple rape cases where the victim and offender are usually acquainted prior to the rape.
She argues that use of VOM programs would potentially encourage more victims of sim-
ple rape to report and avoids the bias the criminal justice system has against such rape
victims).
82. See Adam Lamparello, Reaching Across Legal Boundaries: How Mediation
Can Help the Criminal Law in Adjudicating "Crimes of Addiction", 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 335, 351-59, 362-72 (2001) (arguing that as long as the criminal justice sys-
tem remains committed to a retributive approach to crimes of addiction, that prison popu-
lations will continue to grow in response to the high recidivism rate of such offenders. The
author extensively explores the success of drug courts in several jurisdictions).
83. Cahill, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing Sharon Covey-Sink's belief that more
pre-conference work is necessary and explaining the need for extensive discussions with
the parties to determine what they want from the process).
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encourage programs to handle more serious crimes in order to make a
larger impact on the criminal justice system.84
2. Voluntary Settlement Conferencing/Case-Management Mediation
Where VOM is "relationship driven" with an emphasis on resto-
ration, the case-management model is "settlement driven.' Judicial
mediation, or what some call "muscle mediation,"8 is a case manage-
ment tool which assists the parties in the risk analysis process. The
case management model focuses on fostering settlement, saving gov-
ernments money, and reducing burgeoning dockets." As one judge
noted, criminal mediations "are driven by need, case explosion,...
and [a recognition that] it is a better way to do business." Case man-
agement mediation provides "another window in the courthouse be-
sides jury trials. ' 9
Another goal for some advocates of case-management criminal
mediation is that inserting a neutral third party into a failed plea ne-
gotiation may also regulate the potential abuses or mishandling of
cases. Examples of this include: overzealous police who overcharge in-
cidents, prosecutors who refuse to bargain with defense counsel on
cases which "should settle," and defense counsel who fail to properly
assess a case or need a "nudge from a judge" to help the defendant
understand the strengths and weaknesses of the case and any options
availablef 0
84. Reimund, supra note 37, at 11 n.51.
85. Umbreit et al., supra note 43, at 29-30.
86. Various writers use the term "muscle mediation" to describe a highly evalua-
tive mediation style. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 10, at 23-27 (defining "muscle media-
tion" as "engaging in very aggressive evaluations of parties' cases and settlement op-
tions ... with the goal of winning a settlement, rather than supporting parties in their
exercise of self-determination'); Stephen P. Anway, Mediation in Copyright Disputes:
From Compromise Created Incentives to Incentive Created Compromises, 18 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 439, 444 (2003) ('The increasing role of lawyers and former judges as
mediators has caused a proliferation of evaluative mediation in recent years. This corre-
lation is largely attributable to the mediators' view that they were selected to participate
in the mediation process because of their familiarity with the litigation system. As a re-
suit, such mediators are more inclined to evaluate disputes rather than merely facilitate
parties toward settlement." (citations omitted)).
87. See Thomas H. Oehmke, Arbitration Highways to the Courthouse-A Litiga-
tor's Roadmap, 86 AM. JUR. TRIALS 111, § 2 (2003) ("With burgeoning dockets, the judici-
ary is even more reluctant to adjudicate cases which, arguably, can be arbitrated or to in-
terfere with the arbitration process or award....'. The author used the word "arbitra-
tion" to refer to all alternative dispute resolution processes.
88. Interview with Judge Barry Wood, Administrative Judge for Jerome County,
Idaho (Sept. 11, 2003) (notes on file with author).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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In contrast to the VOM process where offenders must admit their
guilt and seek to make amends,"' the case-management model re-
quires none of these. Under the case-management model, a neutral
third party usually intervenes in the process at the request of the par-
ties and/or the court after the parties' initial attempts at negotiation
or plea bargaining have failed. The mediator is called under the belief
that a neutral third party could beneficially assist the parties past
impasse and toward settlement. The exact process used is fairly case
dependent, though it is fair to say that the majority of pre-conviction
mediations follow the shuttle diplomacy model. In contrast the caucus
model is seldom used in VOM programs.
The case-management model now being used in some states,
such as Idaho, is focused on the retributive justice paradigm, with the
prosecutor as the primary negotiating party at the mediation table
across from the represented offender. While victims and family mem-
bers may be present for at least some portions of the conference, and
some victim offender dialogue is theoretically possible, in practice the
session itself is closer to facilitated plea negotiation than to VOM. If
the victim and the offender can reconcile, this is an added bonus.
Healing relationships is a by-product which may occur under the case
management model, but it is not a primary focus.
While there is no empirical data on the matter, judges appear to
be conducting the majority of the serious case-management media-
tions. Judges offer several advantages. They are generally cost-free,
as they are already under full-time public employment contracts; they
have the support of their colleagues; they often have subject matter
expertise from previously trying or presiding over a significant num-
ber of criminal cases; and they are interested and willing to mediate
criminal cases.2 As discussed in Part III.0, the use of judges also
raises concerns regarding lack of training and the use of a highly
evaluative style, which may result in unduly pressuring defendants
into waiving their constitutionally protected rights.
91. Price, supra note 36.
92. Interview with Judge Barry Wood, Administrative Judge for Jerome County,
Idaho (Sept. 11, 2003) (notes on file with author). Judge Wood recommends criminal me-
diation in many of his felony cases. He said that he used judges as mediators for two rea-
sons. First it is, in large part, a matter of economics. Second, the judges are interested in
it. He further noted that it promotes a team concept amongst the judges as they help each
other out.
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III. CONCERNS WITH CASE-MANAGEMENT MEDIATION IN
THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT
A. Introduction
The better established victim-offender forms of criminal media-
tion have long been subject to several criticisms. Critics argue that
VOM and community dispute resolution programs perpetuate and
sometimes exacerbate power imbalances between victims and offend-
ers, 3 have unsettling constitutional implications,9 4 potentially violate
separation of power considerations when the programs are operated
inside a prosecutor's office, 95 and inappropriately privatize public jus-
tice." Central to these criticisms is the conviction that criminal ac-
tions belong to the state, not the victim, making it fundamental that
criminal law be enforced publicly with full constitutional protections
and opportunity for public input and oversight, rather than through
private dispute resolution mechanisms.97
These concerns are also present under the case-management
model.9 In those states where case-management mediation has
gained a foothold in the criminal context, the practice has leaped
ahead without adequate reflection on the potential problems it creates
and the safeguards that need to be put into place in order to protect
the integrity of the criminal justice system. We will now turn to the
five most pressing concerns arising in the criminal mediation context.
The purpose of this section is to begin reflection, free of the illusion
93. Brown, supra note 53, at 1271-72 (noting that in VOM programs, the inex-
perienced wrongdoer is frequently a first time offending juvenile who often lacks the ex-
perience and the information about the criminal justice system that might increase their
bargaining power); Guill, supra note 73, at 1329 ("On the one hand, a prisoner may be co-
erced into participation through the specter of doing poorly in a jury trial. On the other
hand, the victim also may feel coerced into participating in mediation by the uncertainty
of a jury trial or pressure from a state official.").
94. Reimund, supra note 37, at 16-44 (discussing the constitutional implications
of restorative justice and concluding that "[rlestorative justice is not on a collision course
with the constitution'; Brown, supra note 53, at 1287-91 (including the Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, particu-
larly in jeopardy in VOM programs where offender's attorney is not invited to attend).
95. Guili, supra note 73, at 1330 (suggesting that when VOM programs are run
out of the prosecutor's office, they can eliminate the judicial branch from the determina-
tion of guilt).
96. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. L.
REv. 1935, 1968 (1993).
97. Id. at 1968-69.
98. More has been written about the concerns in the VOM context because that
form of ADR has been around longer than the fairly recent case-management model.
Many of the concerns identified in this article come from notes taken at the "Mediating
the Criminal Case" seminar. Seminar, supra note 7.
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that definitive answers to the complexities surrounding case-
management criminal mediation could be forthcoming at this early
juncture.
B. Who are the Stakeholders, and Who Comes to the Table
Critical to any mediation is the need to identify the stakeholders
to the dispute, to determine who should come to the table, and to
agree upon the roles of each participant." In the case-management
criminal mediation model, these issues are particularly pronounced as
to the role of the victim.
1. The Stakeholders in a Case-Management Mediation
In case-management mediations, attorneys assume prominent
roles, coming to the table in their representational/advocacy capaci-
ties. The defense counsel represents his or her client; the prosecutor
represents the interests of the state. The stakeholders on the defense
side are fairly predictable-foremost the defendant and the defense
counsel, 100 and possibly co-defendants and their counsel, as well as
significant others or support persons. Certain uninvited and invisible
participants also attend with the public defender-the chief public de-
fender, other clients, other defense counsel, the public, the govern-
mental funding sources, and the media. These lesser stakeholders are
best understood by comparing the individualized and the institutional
paradigms under which public defender offices operate.
99. See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO.
L.J. 1355, 1430-31 (1991) (noting that the court describes the mediation process as in-
cluding "direct involvement by representatives of the stakeholders in the deliberative
process'. See generally, John Alan Cohan, Environmental Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, The Public Trust Doctrine and Corporate Ethics, and
Environmental Dispute Resolution, 20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 133, 174 (2001) (noting
that effective mediations require all stakeholders to be present in person or through rep-
resentation, ground rules must be set, and a manageable number of stakeholder repre-
sentatives attend).
100. Defense counsel has numerous roles-social worker, investigator, resource
center, negotiator, diagnostician, and advisor. See Benson B. Weintraub, The Role of De-
fense Counsel at Sentencing, 150 PLI/CRIM 145, 152 (1989). Participants in the "Mediating
the Criminal Case" seminar described the role of the defense attorney as one who zeal-
ously advocates for his/her client-the defendant; the protector of the system; the protec-
tor of people's constitutional rights; wheeler and dealers; the educator for their clients; a
business person who must make business considerations in order to stay in business; a
friend to the accused; one who strives to rehabilitate the defendant; someone who makes
numerous assessments and provides a reality check; and the watch dog of the criminal
justice system. Seminar, supra note 7.
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Defenders' offices experience tension between their role as the
zealous defender of the rights of the individual defendant (their indi-
vidualized role) 01 and the institutionalized paradigm where they de-
liberate collectively about budgets, operations, and issues common to
all clients.0 2 These two competing paradigms co-exist in public de-
fenders' offices: the individualized paradigm encourages autonomy
and idiosyncratic approaches to their client's defense; the institutional
paradigm compels defenders to consider office-wide policies even
when defending individual clients.13 Under the institutional para-
digm, public defender offices act "as an institutional obstacle to the
state's exercise of unchecked power," thus "provid[ing] a more vigor-
ous defense to the class of clients they represent[]." 0 4
While the institutional paradigm thus generally supplements
and strengthens the public defender's individualized role, the two
paradigms sometimes become opposed, as when a defender's office is
faced with a conflict of interest between two or more clients.05 In the
face of such conflict, a defender under the individualized paradigm
would take a first-come, first-served approach, securing the consent of
every client involved. The institutional paradigm, however, would di-
rect the defender to use strategies that consider the greater interests
of the class of clients the office represents.'06
The individualized role of the public defender is premised on the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel to defendants in
criminal cases and designates the lawyer as an assistant who helps
guide the client in his "interaction with an otherwise impenetrable le-
gal system."10 1 It is also premised on the underlying structure of the
adversary system-that the truth will show itself when two adversar-
ial parties each present their strongest case. As one commentator has
written, "the truth will emerge through a dialectical process, in which
the vigorous advocacy of thesis and antithesis will equip the neutral
arbiter to synthesize the data and reach a conclusion."' Thus, the in-
101. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating
Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2428, 2435 (1996) (This individualized
paradigm took hold in the 1960s and 1970s and prevails in today's public defender of-
fices.); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("Defense lawyer best
serves the public, not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert with it, but rather by
advancing the undivided interests of his client.').
102. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 101, at 2431.
103. Id. at 2432.
104. Id. at 2433.
105. Id. at 2433.
106. Id. at 2441.
107. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sus-
tain Public Defenders, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1239,1250 (1993).
108. Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission": Reflections on the
"Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 125, 136 (1987); see also Herring
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dividualized paradigm manifests itself in counsel's role as a zealous
advocate.
The public defender's institutionalized role is premised on the
distinction found in the Constitution between lawyers representing
defendants in criminal cases and those representing other clients. The
Constitution requires that criminal clients be afforded a lawyer.
10 9
Appointed lawyers serve fundamental institutional functions essen-
tial to an adversarial criminal justice system by providing guarantees
that the system operates properly so that the defendant receives a fair
trial. 10 One of the essential institutional duties of a defender is to
"utilize an intricate system of checks and limits on behalf of his client
and against the government.""' The defense lawyer is thus an officer
of the court. For example, it is argued that a lawyer must put her per-
sonal knowledge of the truth aside and, as an officer of the court, is
forbidden to act upon that knowledge so as to allow the adversary sys-
tem to function properly. The system, on this view, is our basic protec-
tion against governmental overreaching."'
The list of potential stakeholders on the prosecution's side is
more diverse than for the defense. It may include the victim, potential
support persons including the victim advocate"' or significant others,
members of the affected community, the public, the media, the elec-
torate, 114 or other government officials." 5 The victim and these exter-
v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) ('The very promise of our adversary system of
criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ul-
timate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.!).
109. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
110. Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional
Role Theory to Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 187 WIS. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1987).
111. Id. at 12.
112. Subin, supra note 108, at 143.
113. See, e.g., Thomas L. Kirsch II, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should Vrc-
tims be Forced to Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 383, 432 (2001) (stating that advocates are used most in counseling the vic-
tim and providing information to the victim); Anna Farber Conrad, The Use of Victim Ad-
vocates and Expert Witnesses in Battered Women Cases, COLO. LAW., Dec. 30, 2001, at 43
(stating that the victim advocate basically educates, communicates, investigates, builds
trust, and identifies resources); Commonwealth v. Harris, 409 Mass. 461, 470 (1991) (rec-
ognizing that victim advocates serve an important and "salutary" function by providing
"victims, witnesses, and family members needed assistance, information, and support,
and generally help them to cope with the realities of the criminal justice system and the
disruption of personal affairs attending a criminal prosecution during a time of personal
trauma'); Allen v. Commonwealth, No. 1999-SC-0897-MR, 2003 WL 1193352, at *4 (Ky.
Jan. 23, 2003) (warning that the victim advocate cannot in any way impair a defendant's
constitutional rights to a fair trial).
114. An uninvited but always present stakeholder in any prosecution is the elec-
torate who holds the power to re-elect the prosecutor; thus the deputy prosecutor's boss,
the elected prosecutor, is also a stakeholder. See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Corn-
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nal others influence the prosecution and hold the prosecutor account-
able for the outcome.
The overarching question in a criminal mediation is who comes
to the table. Under the UMA, participants at a mediation can be "par-
ties" or "nonparty participants."'16 A "[mlediation party" is defined
under the UMA as "a person that participates in a mediation and
whose agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute.""' "Nonparty
participant" includes "a person, other than a party or mediator, that
participates in a mediation."'' 8 The UMA makes these distinctions for
purposes of determining the level of privilege." 9 Examples of "non-
party participants" under the UMA include "experts, friends, support
persons, potential parties, and others who participate in the media-
tion."2 0 The Reporter's Notes add that "counsel for a mediation party
would not be a mediation party, because their agreement is not neces-
sary to the resolution of the dispute."''
The criminal case-management context raises interesting ques-
tions about who qualifies as a "mediation party" under the UMA. Nei-
ther the victim nor counsel for the defendant would be mediation par-
ties under the UMA, as neither of their "agreement[s] [are] necessary
to resolve the dispute."' 2 Nonetheless, everyone agrees that certain
stakeholders must attend a criminal mediation-the prosecutor, the
defendant, and the defense counsel. The most controversial potential
non-participant attendee is the victim. The victim's role in our current
criminal justice system and thus in a criminal mediation is best un-
derstood by looking briefly at the role of the victim and the prosecutor
from a historical perspective.
During the American colonial period, the prosecution of crime
was private, and the victim or other interested party had a right to
prosecute a case against a criminal defendant. 22 During this time, a
system of public prosecution developed that relegated the victim from
munity to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 329 (2002) (noting that prosecutors
wield their discretionary powers in ways that seek support from the electorate in future
elections).
115. In the federal system, the Attorney General appears to be inserting himself
into the capital cases and thus is a stakeholder as well. John Gleeson, Supervising Fed-
eral Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General Should Defer When US. Attorneys
Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1697-98 (2003).
116. UMA, supra note 33, § 2(4), (5).
117. Id. § 2(5).
118. Id. § 2(4).
119. Id. § 4(b)(3) (stating that nonparty participants have a limited privilege).
120. Id. § 2, cmt. § 2(4).
121. Id. § 2, cmt. § 2(5).
122. Id. § 2(5).
123. Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An
Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117, 125 (1984).
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an active participant to that of a witness.2 4 Because the public prose-
cutor became an officer of the local government, his role superceded
that of the private individual prosecutor, and the state's interests su-
perceded those of the private individuals. 25 The decline of restitution
as a criminal sanction further limited the victim's role to that of a
witness. 2 ' This signaled a rejection of criminal law as the mechanism
for the victim to receive a remedy from the offender himself, and the
remedy became instead a civil suit in tort.'27
However, in the 1970s and 1980s the idea of restitution enjoyed a
resurgence and has facilitated the idea that restitution is a valid sen-
tencing alternative. 2 8 Because of the victim's interest in restitution as
well as retribution and knowing that the sentence will determine if
the victim receives either one and how much, victims often want to
communicate their wishes to the sentencing court. 2 ' Today, courts
may not ignore the concerns of victims, and prosecutors are required
to consider the victim's interests in the criminal process. 3 Nonethe-
less, prosecutors retain the ultimate decisionmaking authority.
Prosecutors perform a unique role in our criminal justice system.
The prosecutor is the party who brings the action on behalf of the
State. As one commentator has noted, "the prosecutor is not merely
the sovereign's lawyer. The sovereign delegates most of its authority
and discretion to its prosecutors. Thus, the prosecutor makes deci-
sions that are ordinarily entrusted to a client.' 3' Yet the prosecutor is
not a client, nor does he or she represent a single client. Rather,
prosecutors represent groups of constituencies. 132 These constituencies
include victims, enforcement agencies, the prosecutor's office, and
even neighborhoods.'33
124. Id.
125. Id. at 126.
126. Id. at 132.
127. Id. at 135.
128. Id. at 137.
129. Id. at 172.
130. Kirk J. Nahra, The Role of Victims in Criminal Investigations and Prosecu-
tions, PROSECUTOR, Aug. 1999, at 28, 31.
131. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 607, 633 (1999).
132. Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to In-
clude the Non-adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 931 (1996);
see also NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (1991) The
Prosecution Function commentary states: "The prosecutor must seek justice. In doing so
there is a need to balance the interests of all members of society, but when the balance
cannot be struck in an individual case, the interest of society is paramount for the prose-
cutor." Id. at 11.
133. Id.
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Some maintain, however, that prosecutors are the client. They do
not need to consult with a private individual; prosecutors only have to
make up their minds and the decision is made. 134 The lack of a defined
client 35 gives the prosecutor unfettered discretion in many areas. 36
While prosecutors must consider many contrasting interests when
making decisions, including the wishes of the victim, they are the ul-
timate decisionmakers. They call the shots, and victims are dependent
on prosecutors to extract revenge or their pound of flesh.
137
2. The Role of the Victim in a Case-Management Criminal Mediation
In the case-management mediation setting, the question remains
whether the victim should be allowed to participate in the process.
The victim's participation raises significant concerns for both the
prosecutor and the defendants. Prosecutors fear giving up control,'3
and defense counsel worry that the victim will preclude the prosecu-
tor from making the defendant a reasonable offer.'39 Even with these
concerns, the victim generally attends.
The presence of the victim or even the victim's family often gives
the victim a greater voice in the ultimate outcome. In one mediation
involving the death of a homosexual man, the mother of the victim at-
tended and adamantly insisted that the case settle because she did
not want the public to learn of her son's sexual preference. 4 ' While
the presence of the mother advantaged the defense in this particular
case, defense counsel on the whole have concerns about the presence
of the victim in a mediation. If presence of the victim increases the
likelihood that the prosecutor will take tougher stands, be less flexi-
ble, or make fewer concessions, then defense counsel do not want the
victim present. Similarly, if the prosecutor wants to be more flexible
134. Id. at 932.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Price, supra note 36, at 3 ("Punishment is primarily for revenge (or ret-
ribution). Victims of heinous crimes commonly demand revenge.'). See generally ROY J.
LEwicK1, DAVID M. SAUNDERS & JOHN W. MINTON, ESSENTIAIS OF NEGOTIATION 159
(1997) ("A dependent audience will generally insist that the negotiator be tough, firm,
demanding, and unyielding in her struggle to obtain the best possible outcome for her
constituents. Failure to perform in this manner (in the eyes of the audience) may lead to
public criticism of the negotiator, in order to pressure (embarrass) her into better per-
formance.").
138. This concern is addressed more fully, infra Part III.D.
139. The presence of additional people may have a significant impact on negotia-
tion styles. Negotiators want a favorable evaluation from the audience. Research studies
have shown that being under surveillance motivates negotiators to "act tough."
140. Judge Monte Carlson served as the mediator in this case and spoke about it
in the "Mediating the Criminal Case" seminar. Seminar, supra note 7.
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and conciliatory, then she would want the actual negotiations to be
less visible to the victim. Research studies have shown that being un-
der surveillance motivates negotiators to "act tough.'
4 1
At the same time, the key participants-prosecutor, defendant,
and defense counsel-may not have any real choice whether to allow
victim participation. Prosecutors are required to consider victims' in-
terests in the criminal process.14 1 Victims consult informally with
prosecutors, they are heard by the prosecutor and court before pre-
trial dispositions are finalized, and are allowed to speak at sentenc-
ing. 43 Nonetheless, the prosecutor retains discretion to exclude the
victim from the courtroom14 and the right to make the final charging
decisions and sentencing recommendations.
4 5
Prosecutors and judges that are in the trenches of the criminal
justice system everyday have been struggling to hold the balance be-
tween the State and the defendant. 14 To find third persons who are
not parties trying to get inside the courthouse is sometimes seen by
some as only complicating life.' Some see the victim as having a det-
rimental impact on the defendants and their interests. 48 They see the
victim's right to be heard as interfering with the defendant's efforts at
formulating a defense. 4
9
Nonetheless, based on the proliferation of victim rights stat-
utes, 5" the modern Crime Victim's Rights Movement,' and the po-
141. See LEWICKI, SAUNDERS & MINTON, supra note 137, at 158 ("When negotia-
tors were observed negotiating with others, those who believed they were under surveil-
lance were significantly more likely to conduct their negotiations in a distributive bar-
gaining manner and to use threats, 'commitment tactics,' and put-downs of their oppo-
nents to gain advantage.').
142. Nahra, supra note 130.
143. Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Par-
ticipation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 296 (1999).
144. Id. at 319.
145. Id. at 313-14 (arguing that the victim should have a veto power over
whether the charge is brought).
146. Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the V/ic-
tims'Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 480 (1999).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 484.
149. Id. at 486 (claiming that if a victim has a right to be heard at all stages of
the criminal proceeding then judges will not be able to limit victim testimony at trial and
elsewhere to the detriment of the defendant). However, the author further states that the
right to be heard is limited to bail, plea, and sentencing. Id.
150. NAT'L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 1996 VICTIMS' RIGHTS SOURCE BOOK: A
COMPILATION AND COMPARISON OF VICTIM RIGHTS LAWS 1 (1996), available at
http://www.ncvc.org/resources/reports/source/book/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2004) (stating
there were a handful of victim rights statutes thirty years ago in a few states compared to
the thousands of statutes in all fifty states at present).
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tential public outcry if a victim who wanted to attend was excluded, it
makes sense that victims generally be allowed to attend mediation
sessions. Consistent with this, some argue that any wall of separation
between the prosecutor and the victim is counterproductive and un-
necessary." 2 Moreover, prosecutors and defense counsel need to un-
derstand that simply because someone is not at the table does not
preclude them from having a significant role in the process. The criti-
cal question is whether the absence of the victim will preclude the
parties from reaching an agreement or foil a resolution. Thus, the
question the defense and prosecution must ask is what effect will the
victim's absence have on the outcome? One commentator describes
this as the "audience effects,"'' maintaining that "[w]hether an audi-
ence is present or absent will affect how a negotiator behaves because
she may say one thing with the audience present and another with
the audience absent."1'
Having the victim present has several advantages. Victims may
have important information that may be relevant to an informed deci-
sion."' Research has shown that the value of the victim's statement at
sentencing depends on the content of the statement. Judges find vic-
tim information regarding the financial, physical, and psychological
impact of crime to be most useful to the sentencing decision. Judges
also have indicated that the victim's opinions or recommendations re-
garding the actual sentence are generally not useful.'56
In addition, the mediation session provides the victim a forum to
vent and to tell his or her story." 7 It also presents the potential for
151. John W. Gillis & Douglas E. Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim
Rights Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV.
689, 689-90 (2002) The modern Crime Victim's Rights Movement began thirty years ago
from a common law tradition that once included victims in the criminal process. This
movement has been very successful and has cut across many political lines by incorporat-
ing general civil rights, general victim law, woman's issues, and the law and order lobby.
Id.
152. Nahra, supra note 130, at 31.
153. LEWICKI, SAUNDERS & MINTON, supra note 137, at 155.
154. Id. at 156.
155. See Gittler, supra note 123, at 125.
156. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process:
Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & Crv. CONFINEMENT 21, 85-86 (1999).
157. JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIvE MEDIATION: A NEW
APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 53 (2000). The authors stated that in mediation
there is a series of conflicting stories and that the task of mediation is the "teasing out" of
these stories to open up possibilities for new ones. Id. The narrative mode of thinking
looks for the complexity and diversity in the stories instead of searching for one true
story. Id. This is conducive to producing a range of possible futures from which mediation
parties can choose. Id. "In this kind of climate, substantive changes are possible." Id. See
also Mark S. Umbreit, Humanistic Mediation: A Transformative Journey of Peacemaking,
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healing."' A skilled criminal mediator should sense when the storytel-
ling assists the process and when venting simply drives a larger
wedge between the prosecution and the defense, making settlement
impossible. Similarly, the mediator should decide when to hold joint
sessions and when to work in caucus.
While allowing the victim or others to attend a criminal media-
tion may be wise, it also significantly changes the dynamics of the
process. The structure of the negotiation becomes more complex as
additional parties and roles are added. Basic negotiation theory
teaches that "[t/he greater the number of individuals, groups, and or-
ganizations that are involved in a negotiation or have a stake in its
outcome, the greater the number of possible interactions between the
parties, the greater the number of roles that can be played, and thus
the more complex the flow of interaction becomes."'59 Multi-party me-
diations introduces a number of different views or positions, multiple
mediations/negotiations going on at the same time, a lengthier proc-
ess, multiple closures, and extra preparation time. 6 '
In multi-party mediations, multiple negotiations are occurring
simultaneously, all under the auspices of the larger negotiation. In a
criminal mediation, the prosecutor is negotiating with the defendant
and defense counsel at the same time that he or she is negotiating
with the victim. Similarly, the defense counsel is negotiating with the
defendant and with the prosecutor and potentially the prosecutor's
audience-the victim, the public, and the community. The prosecutor
must build relationships with both the victim and the defendant in
order to resolve the matter.
The question remains as to who appropriately makes the decision
of whether the victim should be permitted to attend a case-
management criminal mediation. The UMA favors letting the parties
decide.' Considered judgment suggests that if the principal parties
14 MEDIATION Q. 201, 210 (1997) (noting that mediators recognize the "intrinsic healing
quality of storytelling when speaking and listening from the heart).
158. Margaret M. Russell, Cleansing Moments and Retrospective Justice, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1225, 1265-67 (2003) (Speaking out can be a healing experience). Fur-
thermore, Russell notes that "[coming to know that one's suffering is not solely a private
experience, best forgotten, but instead an indictment of a social cataclysm, can permit in-
dividuals to move beyond trauma, hopelessness, numbness, and preoccupation with loss
and injury." Id. at 1266 (quoting MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS 67 (1998)).
159. LEWICKI, SAUNDERS & MINTON, supra note 137, at 151.
160. ROY J. LEWICK] ET AL., NEGOTIATION 334-51 (1999).
161. UMA, supra note 33, § 10 (providing that "[a]n attorney or other individual
designated by a party may accompany the party to and participate in a mediation'.
Comments to Section 10 further state: "the Drafting Committee elected to let the parties,
not the mediator, decide [who comes to the table] .... As a practical matter, this provi-
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cannot decide themselves, then the decision should fall to the media-
tor.162 The latter, however, is problematic; if a party strenuously ob-jects to the mediator's decision, he or she will probably opt out of the
process. Thus the UMA approach is the most workable.
Once it is determined who can attend, the parties then must de-
cide what role each participant will play. The roles should be clear
and articulated as part of the ground rules. Multiple logistical ques-
tions arise. If several people want to attend, should they appoint a
spokesperson? Should support persons be allowed to be present but
remain silent? Should support persons be present in the room or be
asked to remain outside and thus serve strictly on a consultative ba-
sis? A potential obstacle is that if one side brings in a support person,
then the other may wish to do the same-for example, the victim ad-
vocate for the victim and the defendant's mother. How far should this
be extended? The answers to these questions must come from a case
by case analysis of the particular circumstances of each dispute.
C. Judges as Mediators
The predominate use of judges to facilitate case-management
criminal mediation raises several concerns. I will focus on two-the
need for judges (among others) to receive training in mediation, and
the potential for judges, because of the somber authority of their posi-
tions, to exert undue coercion on defendants that could lead defen-
dants to plead guilty and waive their constitutional rights.
The field of criminal mediation has grown organically based on
requests from either the assigned judge or the parties. During this
growth, little attention has been given to the qualifications for crimi-
nal mediators. Thus far, extensive criminal experience and expense
seem to be the deciding factors in selecting a person to conduct crimi-
nal mediations.
The lack of training for mediators in the criminal context is a ma-jor concern. Just as in civil mediation,163 mediators in the criminal
arena must be trained. Experience as a judge (or as a criminal litiga-
sion has application only when the parties are compelled to participate in the media-
tion .... In other instances, any party or mediator unhappy with the decision of a party
to be accompanied by an individual can simply leave the mediation." Id. § 10 cmts.
162. Opinion of the participants in the "Mediating the Criminal Case" seminar
held as part of the University of Idaho's Northwest Institute for Dispute Resolution in
May 2003. Seminar, supra note 7.
163. See Hiram E. Chodosh, Judicial Mediation and Legal Culture, 4 E-JOURNAL
OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY, 10 (1999) at 8 (defining judi-
cial mediation in the civil context as "a confidential, consensual form of dispute resolution
facilitated by a sitting or retired judge who is trained in conflict resolution" (emphasis
added)), at http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/wf99l2Ol/epf3l2.htm. (last visited
Mar. 29, 2004).
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tor) is not sufficient to make one a good mediator. Subject matter ex-
pertise is only one of the relevant qualifications of a good criminal
mediator.
In the civil context, scholars have articulated numerous reasons
for establishing standards and qualifications for mediators. Those rea-
sons include protecting consumers,14 protecting the integrity of the
various dispute resolution processes, establishing credibility for indi-
vidual mediators, 6 5 enhancing the prestige and legitimacy of the me-
diation field, 6 s encouraging confidence in the process for disputants
and courts,' promoting competence, 16 8 improving the quality of me-
164. Amy J. Glass et al., Proposed Court Rules Introduce Mediation-Specific
Qualifications for Neutrals Serving in Court-Annexed ADR Programs, 79 MICH. B.J. 510
(2000) (stating that prohibiting non-lawyer mediators from participating is a way to "pro-
tect the public from poor-quality services potentially unfair settlements'; Newton R. Rus-
sell, Mediation: The Need and a Plan for Voluntary Certification, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 613,
613 (1996) (qualifications are needed to protect sophisticated and unsophisticated con-
sumers); W. Lee Dobbins, The Debate over Mediator Qualifications: Can They Satisfy the
Growing Need to Measure Competence Without Barring Entry into the Market?, 7 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL*Y 95, 96 (1994) (noting that advocates of certification "fear that as more
mediators enter the field, incompetent mediators will practice freely on an uninformed
public while the talents of highly skilled mediators will go unrecognized').
165. Stephanie A. Henning, A Framework for Developing Mediator Certification
Programs, 4 HARV. NEGO'r. L. REV. 189, 196 (1999) (citing Thomas D. Cavenaugh, A
Quantitative Analysis of the Use and Avoidance of Mediation by Cook County, Illinois Le-
gal Community, 14 MEDIATION Q. 353, 363-64 (1997) (noting that "[slome researchers
speculate that lawyers, who have themselves completed a prescribed course of study, are
hesitant to use mediators who are not required to satisfy even a minimal set of qualifica-
tions').
166. Id. at 190 (talking about certification).
167. Carey, supra note 71, at 636. Carey cites California Senator Newton Russell,
Chair of the Senate Select Subcommittee on Mediation, who authored California SB 1428
because he believed that a certification process would encourage confidence and assist in
providing affordable dispute resolution processes and ease the civil court docket. Id. In
addition, asserting that courts and disputant who have more confidence in the compe-
tence of the mediators will use the process more and refer more parties to it. Id.
168. See generally SOC'Y OF PROF'S IN DISP. RES., COMM'N ON QUALIFICATIONS,
PRINCIPLES CONCERNING QUALIFICATIONS 3-6, 9-12 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 SPIDR
REPORT]. This suggests a seven step framework for developing qualification requirements
for mediation programs. The framework is in the form of questions to be asked when es-
tablishing requirements:
1. What is the context in which the program is to take place?
2. Who is responsible for ensuring competence?
3. What do practitioners and programs do (what are their tasks)?
4. What does it mean to be competent?
5. How do practitioners and programs become competent?
6. How is competence assessed?
7. How should assessment tools, such as certification, be used to assure quality?
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diation for users of mediation services, 6 ' and increasing the public
and legal community's confidence in mediation so as to "earn favor
with legislatures and lead to increased funding of mediation."'7
As civil mediation has grown in popularity and acceptance,
courts, administrators, disputants, the mediation community, and the
legal community have searched for some quality assurances.17 ' Over
the past two decades, this search has resulted in the adoption of quali-
fication requirements by most states and federal courts for their civil
and domestic rosters of mediators. 7 2 Standard requirements for se-
lecting mediators usually include at least two or more of the following
qualifications: training in mediation; experience as a mediator; educa-
tional degrees; and, sometimes, receiving a passing score on a skills-
based test.' The purpose behind such requirements is to have some
basis to effectively predict performance ability in mediation.'74 The
first two requirements of training and mediation experience are fairly
universally accepted certification standards. The latter two-
educational degrees and achieving a passing score on a skills-based
test-generate substantial controversy in the civil context.
In the criminal context, the importance of training, experience,
and educational degrees must be addressed. Performance-based test-
ing, though widely acclaimed in the civil arena, 7 5 remains controver-
Id.; see also Moberly, supra note 20, at 707 (stating that "[alithough competence of the
mediator is a goal, it is relatively difficult to define'); Carey, supra note 71, at 641 (provid-
ing her own list of eight competencies necessary for mediators).
169. Henning, supra note 165, at 190 (talking about certification).
170. Id. at 196.
171. Id. at 196-97, 207 (citing Cavenaugh, supra note 165) (noting that one study
showed that lawyers have an unwillingness to mediate cases through unregulated media-
tors).
172. Norma Jeanne Hill, Qualification Requirements of Mediators, 1998 J. DISP.
RESOL. 37, 39-43 (1998).
173. Id. at 40.
174. Id. at 45. But see Paul F. Devine, Mediator Qualifications: Are Ethical Stan-
dards Enough to Protect the Client?, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 187, 207 (1993) ("[Tlhe
only qualifications necessary are the skills used in the process itself. This is not to say
that there is no need for training. However, imposition of specific requirements of length
and scope of training, education, and background is both unnecessary and impractical.').
But see Deborah M. Kolb & Kenneth Kressel, The Realities of Making Talk Work, in
WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 473 (1994) (advocating a selection and
training process comparable to a residency in psychiatry which uses interviews for selec-
tion and experience and supervision for training).
175. Barbara Filner & Michael Jenkins, Performance-Based Evaluation of Media-
tors: The San Diego Mediation Center's Experience, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 647, 656-57, 658
(1996); Paul J. Spiegelman, Certifying Mediators: Using Selection Criteria to Include the
Qualified-Lessons From the San Diego Experience, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 677, 704-06 (1996)('Any requirements concerning who can practice as a neutral should be based on per-
formance."); 1989 SPIDR REPORT, supra note 168, at 9 (finding that performance-based
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sial for two reasons. First, it is expensive to administer. Secondly, it is
very difficult to reach agreement on which standards to apply.7 6 As
such, the practical use and viability of performance-based testing in
the criminal field is minimal at this time and will not be explored fur-
ther in this article.
1. Training in Mediation
At present, there is only one requirement in place regulating who
can serve as a criminal mediator-experience as a practitioner (law-
yer or judge) in criminal law. However, as in the civil context, media-
tors in the criminal arena should be required to secure, at the very
least, basic mediation training (preferably focusing specifically on
mediating the criminal case and requiring continuing training
courses).
In the civil arena, training is the least controversial qualification
criterion.' It is generally accepted that training is a critical prerequi-
site to becoming a successful mediator.' Yet while most agree that
training is necessary,' studies generally show that training is not
testing is an accurate method of assessing mediator competence and recommended it
when ever feasible).
176. Deborah M. Kolb & Jonathan E. Kolb, All the Mediators in the Garden, 9
NEGOT. J. 335 (1993) (noting that opponents to performance-based testing maintain that
successful mediation cannot be reduced to a defined set of behaviors and that any per-
formance test would be even more inaccurate than degree-based or training-based crite-
ria); Christopher Honeyman, On Evaluation Mediators, 6 NEGOT. J. 23, 26 (1990) (noting
that some fear that performance-based testing will further restrict the field as the results
will simply reflect the mediator evaluators' own bias); Carey, supra note 71, at 642 (
pointing out that many important mediation competencies cannot be tested using "objec-
tive" test questions).
177. Sue Bronson, Improving Mediator Competence Through Self-Assessment, 18
MEDIATION Q. 171, 171 (2000) ("Most mediators agree that basic training in the skills and
process of mediation are important.'.
178. Filner & Jenkins, supra note 175, at 657 ('Most practitioners have accepted
the value of training as one criterion for credentialing mediators.'); Dobbins, supra note
164, at 99 ("Most mediators agree that training is very important to becoming a skilled
mediator.'; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Measuring Both the Art and Science of Mediation, 9
NEGOTIATION J. 321, 322 (1993) (explaining that training is indispensable to the success
of any mediation program); Edward F. Hartfield, Qualifications and Training Standards
for Mediators of Environmental and Public Policy Disputes, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 109,
118-19 (1988) (stating that some believe that there is a direct link between training and
quality of mediation and that the more role-play and simulation experience one has, the
better mediator one will be).
179. Bruce C. McKinney et al., A Nationwide Survey of Mediation Centers, 14
MEDIATION Q. 155, 163 (1996) (the majority of the mediation centers responding to the
survey ranked training as their most important qualification for mediators); Henning,
supra note 165, at 196 ("Some researchers speculate that lawyers, who have themselves
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sufficient to ensure competence.'8s Training serves as an introduction.
Continuing education and ongoing professional growth and experi-
ence help ensure competence. At the same time, no amount of train-
ing can make certain people competent mediators. Good mediators
generally possess a mixture of training, experience, and personal
characteristics"" conducive to the practice. 82
Several commentators in the mediation community have written
on the appropriate content for a basic mediation course.8 3 The dia-
logue, at least in the context of civil mediation, has resulted in sub-
stantial agreement on the appropriate format for training pro-
grams.8 4 In the criminal context, however, the field is wide-open. To
date, no comprehensive mediation course has been designed to date
specifically for those interested in the case-management model of
criminal mediation. 88 Training for criminal mediation must address
many of the same topics present in civil mediation training-
dynamics of conflict, mediation process and theory, communication
skills, confidentiality, ethics, styles of mediation, and the role of the
mediator.'" The training also must address topics specific to criminal
completed a prescribed course of study, are hesitant to use mediators who are not re-
quired to satisfy even a minimal set of qualifications." citing Cavenaugh, supra note 165).
180. Henning, supra note 165, at 16; Margaret Shaw, Selection, Training, and
Qualification of Neutrals, in THE NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE
RESOLUTION RESEARCH 156, 163 (Susan Keilitz ed. 1994) (asserting that training alone is
not sufficient to ensure competence).
181. See Margaret L. Shaw, Mediator Qualifications: Report of a Symposium on
Critical Issues in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 125, 163 (1988)
(the research shows that "predisposition to being an able mediator, as measured by an
individual's conflict management style, was more significantly determinative of mediator
effectiveness across time and in post-training role play and actual mediation performance
than either training or prior experience').
182. Christopher Honeyman, On Evaluating Mediators, 6 NEGOT. J. 23, at 26-30
(1990).
183. See Kathy Kirk, Mediation Training: What's the Point, Are the Tricks Really
New, and Can an Old Dog Learn?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 637, 653-57 (1998) (providing, in
addition, a list of reasons for engaging in training).
184. Henning, supra note 165, at 220.
185. The sixteen-hour "Mediating the Criminal Case" seminar offered in May
2003 as part of the University of Idaho College of Law's Northwest Institute for Dispute
Resolution served as an overview and exploration of the process. A fuller and more in-
depth training needs to be developed and offered on an on-going basis. Seminar, supra
note 7.
186. In the civil realm, scholars and practitioners differ as to whether the media-
tor has a role in ensuring the fairness of the outcome of a mediation. See, e.g., KOVACH,
supra note 3, at 159 (arguing that mediators should not substitute their own judgment
regarding the fairness of the outcome of a mediation as the participants may not share
the reasons that they made their decision and thus it is difficult for a mediator to discover
all the information necessary to make a determination of what is fair); Filner & Jenkins,
supra note 175, at 650 (arguing that if a mediator communicates to the parties what she
considers to be a fair settlement, then she is not practicing mediation); John W. Cooley,
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mediation-who are the stakeholders, coercion,"8 7 constitutional
waiver issues, conflicts of interest,'8 confidentiality,I 9 reports to the
assigned judge,' and substantive knowledge. While some in the civil
arena argue that too much substantive knowledge can close a media-
tor's mind to innovative ideas,19' in the criminal case-management
context, defense counsel, prosecutors, and the trial judge all want a
mediator with significant criminal experience.
92
Mediator & Advocates Ethics, 55 DIsP. RESOL. J. 73, 78 (2000) (asserting that the media-
tor's role is to perform checks during the process of mediation to guarantee that the
agreement is fair and equitable from the perceptions of the participants); Stephen G. Bul-
lock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the Mediative Art: A Guide to Institu-
tionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885, 903 (1997) (noting the fair-
ness/protection of rights model has been criticized as not upholding mediator neutrality).
In contrast to civil cases, Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires that all settlements be
approved by the court. Thus the sitting judge assures the soundness of the agreement.
This is in contrast to civil cases where the disputants may privately resolve a dispute and
simply agree to dismiss the underlying complaint.
187. Training must address the potential coercive effect judicial mediators may
have on defendants or their counsel.
188. Role identification is critical. Judges should not serve both as adjudicator
and neutral facilitator anymore than an attorney-mediator can serve in both adversarial
and neutral conciliator capacities. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too Great:
Judges Should Not Mediate Cases Assigned to Them For Trial, DISP. RESOL. MAO., Fall
1999, at 11; Frank E. A. Sander, A Friendly Amendment, DISP. RESOL. MAG. Fall 1999, at
11; State v. Tolias, 954 P.2d 907 ( Wash. 1998). In Tolias, the county prosecutor at-
tempted to resolve an ongoing dispute between neighbors and subsequently successfully
prosecuted one of the parties on a felony charge arising out of the same dispute. The
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and held that the trial court should have
granted defendant's motion to recuse because "the prosecutor violated the appearance of
fairness doctrine" as the prosecutor's efforts to mediate the dispute precluded him from
prosecuting the case. State v. Tolias, 929 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). The
Washington Supreme Court subsequently reversed the appellate court on procedural
grounds asserting that the appearance of fairness issue was not properly raised at the
trial court level. Tolias, 954 P.2d at 907; see also Imbrogno, supra note 36.
189. One participant of the "Mediating the Criminal Case" seminar suggested
that the parties could agree to make non-disclosure of confidential information a factor to
be taken into consideration at any subsequent parole hearing. Seminar, supra note 7.
190. See UMA, supra note 33, § 7. This section, entitled "Prohibited Mediator Re-
ports," states exactly what may be disclosed. It does not allow a judicial mediator to talk
with the assigned judge or other judges about what happened during a particular media-
tion. Id. See also Michael A. Perino, Drafting Mediation Privileges: Lessons from the Civil
Justice Reform Act, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) ("Confidentiality is particularly
important in court-annexed programs, where parties may fear that if they do not reach a
resolution of their dispute, anything they say may be reported back to the court.").
191. See Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A
Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 762 (1997).
192. This was the opinion expressed by judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel
during the sixteen-hour seminar on "Mediating the Criminal Case." Seminar, supra note
7.
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Even though most of the mediators in the criminal context are
judges, this does not exempt them from the need for mediation train-
ing. In fact, some argue that judicial mediation is a contradiction in
terms.193 Similar to other good lawyers, judges who wish to be media-
tors must have training."" For the most part, judges have the experi-
ence and subject matter expertise to adjudicate disputes. For most of
them, law school and subsequent continuing legal education seminars,
however, have not adequately equipped them with the conciliatory
skills necessary to successfully negotiate or mediate a case. 95
2. Experience in Mediation
In the civil arena, experience is also largely accepted as a helpful
screening device for mediator selection. 196 It is this aspect of the me-
diator's background that has been shown to correlate most with effec-
tiveness in reaching settlement.97 While some people are "naturals,"
even good mediators can look back and reflect about how they han-
dled their first few mediations versus those they conducted later in
time. Experience brings more confidence and allows mediators to de-
velop new tools and bring new approaches and ideas to the mediation
table. The biggest debate in this area is the quantity versus the qual-
ity of experience.'"
193. Chodosh, supra note 163. Chodosh states: "Judges are suppose to judge (not
mediate), to apply law (not interests), to evaluate (not facilitate), to order (not accommo-
date) and to decide (not settle)." Id. Having said this, he also argues that judging and me-
diating are not mutually exclusive functions. Id.
194. See ERIc GALTON, REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN MEDIATION 8 (1994) ("Un-
equivocally, specific mediation training is essential for anyone who holds himself out to be
a mediator. Some lawyers, feeling they have been negotiating all their practice lives...
simply declare themselves to be 'mediators' without receiving any specific mediation
training. Mediation... is a process. As with any other process, appropriate training and
study is necessary.').
195. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFEc'wE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT
277 (1993) (NJudges must also learn to use those conciliatory skills that are likely to gen-
erate negotiated settlements.").
196. See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, PoLIcY,
PRACTICE § 11:02 (2d ed. 1994) (pointing out that actual experience mediating has
emerged as an important qualification factor); 1989 SPIDR REPORT, supra note 168, at 9
("Experience can be a useful screening tool to identify those who can mediate... "); Shaw,
supra note 181, at 131 (mediation experience is a "valuable asset, and an important factor
in the mediation selection process"); Hill, supra note 172, at 41 ('Given the widespread
acceptance of training and experience as qualification requirements.., these two re-
quirements as a means of measuring competence are not hotly debated issues in the ADR
community.). But see Dobbins, supra note 164, at 105-06 (pointing out that some doubt
the importance of experience at all).
197. Hill, supra note 172, at 41.
198. Shaw, supra note 181, at 131 (maintaining that it is the debate regarding
the quality versus the quality of experience that matters.)
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3. Educational Degrees
While possessing some stipulated educational degree is the most
controversial and hotly debated selection criterion in the civil arena, 199
it is a non-issue under the case-management model. Case-
management criminal mediation provides an instance where legal
knowledge and training are essential to the process. Prosecutors, de-
fense counsel, and sitting judges all want someone legally trained (ei-
ther a judge or lawyer) and with significant criminal experience to
serve as mediator. 00 The ideal mediator for most prosecutors and de-
fense counsel is someone who can assist them in evaluating the
strengths and weaknesses of their cases.2"' Only someone with signifi-
cant criminal law experience, built atop a law degree, can do this.
4. Potential for Undue Coercion
Judicial mediators must recognize the potential coercive effect
their presence may have on defendants or their counsel. Prosecutors
199. See, e.g., 1989 SPIDR REPORT, supra note 168, at 9. The SPIDR Report
states:
Knowledge acquired in obtaining various degrees can be useful in the prac-
tice of dispute resolution. At this point and for the foreseeable future, how-
ever, no such degree in itself ensures competence as a neutral. Furthermore,
requiring a degree would foreclose alternative avenues of demonstrating dis-
pute resolution competence. Consequently, no degree should be considered a
prerequisite for service as a neutral.
Id. The 1989 SPIDR Report found that the potential advantages to a degree requirement
did not outweigh the negative ramifications. The SPIDR Commission was concerned that
degree requirements would only serve as a barrier, precluding many potentially skilled
mediators from entering the profession. Id. at 15; Hill, supra note 172, at 41, 45 (express-
ing concern that degree requirements will "unduly restrict entrance into the mediation
field" and noting that degree requirements are "Probably the least effective predictor).
Hill further stated:
Educational degree requirements are likely to be found in violation of Title
VII as they may easily operate to exclude disproportionate numbers of
women and minorities. Furthermore, an educational degree requirement
could probably not be validated as there is no indication that having a par-
ticular degree is at all related to performing the job of a mediator.
Id. at 49.
200. This is evidenced both from comments made during the seminar "Mediating
the Criminal Case" and by Circuit Court Judge Frank Bell's appointment of an experi-
enced criminal lawyer in the King brothers' mediation. Bill Kaczor, Lawyers Back More
Mediations; Boys Begin Sentences for Murder, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 16, 2002, at
10B. The Westlaw citation to this article is 2002 WL 102436423.
201. Participants in the "Mediating the Criminal Case" seminar expressed this
view. Seminar, supra note 7.
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already wield nearly absolute power in the criminal arena and exert
that power in the plea bargaining setting."2 Some have argued that in
the plea context coerciveness is so pervasive that it sometimes results
in innocent people pleading guilty.2"3 Judicial mediators need to be
cautious not to unduly add the power of the robe into the equation.2 4
Participants in the mediation process want the judicial mediator
to perform multiple tasks which at times may conflict. The judicial
mediator is expected to assist the participants with a risk analysis, to
bring a voice of objective reason to the table, to protect the defendant
from coercive tactics, to persuade the participants to settle, and to
preserve the integrity of the mediation process and ultimately the
criminal justice system. They want the judicial mediator to determine
when one side or the other is not acting in good faith and to either get
them to change their bargaining position or to call the mediation.0 5
Although judicial mediators may not perceive their actions as co-
ercive, they cannot underestimate their influence on the settlement
process and the weight their 'Judicious recommendation" carries,
while still maintaining they are simply accommodating the parties'
desires. 0 6 Parties and attorneys generally perceive a judge as "a per-
son of integrity, as an impartial and fair mediator with a background
of experience in their type of case, and as an administrator of justice
from whom they can expect a judicious recommendation for settle-
ment. '" °7 And that is usually what they get. As one judge noted,
202. Jeff Palmer, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: An End to the Same Old Song and
Dance, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 505, 521 (1999). The Federal guidelines offer an incentive to
plea bargain by reducing the defendant's offense level if he or she pleads with or without
mediation. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 3E1.1(a) application
note 3 (2002) (stating that an "entry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial
combined with truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense... will constitute
significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility for the purposes of subsection (a)').
203. The 1992 Yale Law Journal's symposium articles discussed the risk that in-
nocent people would plead guilty. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Com-
promise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster,
101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Con-
tract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect
Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011 (1992).
204. See Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution:
What Form of Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2085-86 (1993)
(maintaining that judicial mediators can "coerce" settlements).
205. This reflects the opinions of some of the participants in the seminar, "Medi-
ating the Criminal Case" seminar. Seminar, supra note 7. But see supra note 186, regard-
ing whether the role of the mediator is to ensure fairness.
206. See Robert C. Zampano, Settlement Strategies for Trial Judges, in JUDGING:
A BOOK FOR STUDENT CLERKS 125, 126-27 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2002) ("The settle-
ment judge must have the patience, open-mindedness, and skill to fashion a settlement
that is fair and reasonable under all circumstances.").
207. Id. at 127.
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"[b]ecause of their experience as adjudicators, judicial mediators tend
to be more evaluative than facilitative, that is, they are generally
more willing to share their evaluation of the merits or value of a
claim. 108
As Professor Riskin so aptly noted when he wrote about evalua-
tive mediators, "the parties should understand that once they involve
a third party, and allow that 'neutral' to give an opinion on the merits,
that determination will almost always have a powerful impact on all
further negotiations. ' 0 9 This is especially problematic in the criminal
arena. While in civil cases some judges view their role as listening,
probing, and exploring each parties' views and then fashioning and
presenting to the disputants his or her "reasonable settlement,"2 10
thus employing an evaluative style, some argue that judges in the
criminal context should refrain from being strongly evaluative out of
concern that the judge's opinion will unduly sway and intimidate the
defendant into pleading guilty and waiving his constitutional rights.
21 1
Thus, while judges think that "lawyers value the judge's opinion of
the merits of their case and appreciate a thoughtful, analytical, and
impartial assessment of the case for settlement purposes, ' 12 the
power of the robe can be coercive even though the mediator is not the
assigned judge. 21
While criminal mediations are ostensibly voluntary, defendants
and their counsel may fear reprisal from the court for failure to par-
ticipate and ultimately settle.114 Although the "fear" may not result in
actual complaints to the court, the apprehension is real, and courts
must be proactive to minimize or allay the concerns. One federal
judge who periodically serves as a settlement conferencing judge,
generally starts each session telling the parties that the process is
voluntary, that the session will not be an "arm twisting" session, and
that he has "concerns about the notion of criminal settlement confer-
ences, the potential for intimidation, and the defendants need to be
208. Chodosh, supra note 163.
209. Riskin, supra note 11, at 44.
210. ALAN SCOTT RAU, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS 549 (3d ed. 2002).
211. E-mail from Magistrate Judge Kelly Arnold, Federal Magistrate Judge for
the Western District of Washington, to author (Aug. 29, 2003) (on file with author).
212. Zampano, supra note 206, at 128.
213. See Alfini, supra note 188, at 12-13 (stating that judges should not serve as
settlement conferencing judges or mediators in cases assigned to them for trial).
214. Notes from the seminar on Mediating the Criminal Case, supra note 7. The
participants expressed concern that courts may begin routinely ordering mediation re-
gardless of the appropriateness of mediation in a particular case.
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free from even the feeling of coercion."2 15 Is that enough of a dis-
claimer? The answer is unclear. What is clear is that such statements
alert counsel and the defendant to the issue of coercion.
Some argue that the presence of competent counsel serves as a
security blanket or buffer which protects defendants from coercive in-
timidation. However, the strength of this assertion is dependent on
the caliber of defense counsel.2 6 The belief that the defendant can
walk out of this "voluntary process" underestimates the control and
power judicial mediators exert. Whether mediation is truly mandatory
versus voluntary depends on one's perspective. Thus, while judges
may deny that mediation in a particular situation is mandatory, de-
fense counsel understand a request from the bench. As one of the de-
fense attorneys in the King brothers' mediation noted, "[t]he judge
asked us-he basically ordered mediation between the parties."2' 7 It is
critical that the growth of criminal mediation involves a truly volun-
tary process and not an implicit requirement leaving defense counsel
in conflict between abiding by the wishes of the client and complying
with the not-so-subtle messages from the court.
Judicial mediators thus need to be trained in mediation and
mindful of the power they exert over the participants in the process.
The judge-mediator sits on a powder keg of rights and liberties that
must not be cavalierly or even inadvertently ignited. The defendant's
life and liberty are at stake in the criminal context. Judicial mediators
need to proceed cautiously and not wait for complaints to arise. A pro-
active response to this burgeoning field is prudent.
D. Defendant and Defense Counsel Concerns: What Does Mediation
Offer Defendants, and How Seriously Does it Threaten Waiver of
Constitutional Rights?
The greatest concern about criminal mediation from the defense
standpoint goes to the waiver of defendants' constitutional rights.
Analysis of this threat requires that it be considered in context, spe-
cifically the context of a criminal justice system that depends heavily
on the process of plea bargaining. The relevant question is whether
the concerns regarding waiver of constitutional rights are substan-
tially different in criminal mediation than in the plea bargaining con-
text where a like threat already exists. Put another way, it is critical
to ask how case-management mediation differs from plea bargaining,
215. E-mail from Magistrate Judge Kelly Arnold, Federal Magistrate Judge for
the Western District of Washington, to author (Aug. 29, 2003) (on file with author).
216. Id.
217. CNN, Rosie Hires Attorneys in King Brother's Case (Oct. 20, 2002), at
http://www.cnn.con2002/LAW/10/19/rosie.king.tria.
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or whether it is merely a natural extension of the plea bargaining
process.
Criminal case-management mediation carries with it many of the
same concerns inherent in the plea bargaining process-coerciveness,
waiver of constitutional rights, power imbalance-as well as some
new ones. At the same time, the process retains all the advantages of
plea bargaining-certainty, resource allocation, closure-with certain
additional advantages. The question becomes whether, if case-
management mediation amounts to a natural extension of the plea
bargaining process, it provides a more or less problematic "next step"
on the criminal dispute resolution spectrum.
Considered from one standpoint, ADR must be seen as having
very deep roots in the criminal justice system. Most criminal cases are
resolved prior to trial,218 most through the plea bargaining process,
which has become a standard part of the American criminal justice
system.219 During plea bargaining, the prosecution and the defense
counsel negotiate the specific charge and sometimes the correspond-
ing punishment. 220 Thus the process generally involves the state offer-
ing the defendant various "charge bargaining concessions" and "sen-
tence bargaining concessions. '"2 The parties often negotiate both the
specific charges and the corresponding punishment. In accepting a
plea, defendants waive certain constitutional rights, including their
right to a trial by jury with the assistance of counsel, their right to
confront witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
2 2
218. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/dO4sepO2.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2003)
(stating that out of the 78,835 defendants during the twelve-month period of 2002, 67,856
cases settled in plea bargaining and 332 entered pleas of noto contendere).
219. Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargaining?: The Core
Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 753 (1998) (citing a 1992 survey
of the seventy-five most populous counties finding that guilty pleas accounted for 92% of
all state court convictions and arguing that while plea bargaining has its flaws, it is "a
natural component of our adversarial system that has been regulated since the nine-
teenth century).
220. Black's Law Dictionary defines plea bargaining as:
The process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case work
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It
usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to one
or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sen-
tence than that possible for the graver charge.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1152 (6th ed. 1990).
221. Guidorizzi, supra note 219, at 756.
222. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 11(c)(3). This rule sets forth the rights that the
court must address with the defendant in open court before accepting a guilty plea. Id.
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Criminal defendants can waive nearly all of their constitutional
rights in the plea context so long as the plea is entered voluntarily
and intelligently, and with the assistance of competent counsel. 21 3 The
Supreme Court has noted that "[tlhe plea bargaining process neces-
sarily exerts pressure on defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a
series of fundamental rights, but we have repeatedly held that the
government may encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial bene-
fits in return for the plea.
12 24
Criticisms of plea bargaining go both directions. One set of critics
argues that plea bargaining is wrong because it is too beneficial to the
defendant; another set maintains that it is wrong because it is too un-
fair to defendants. Central to both sides of the argument is a belief
that plea bargaining "undermines the integrity of the criminal justice
system.2 2 5 As one commentator aptly put it, "[o]bservers criticize[]
plea bargaining both as an 'incompetent, inefficient, and lazy method
of administering justice' and as a compromise of the defendant's right
to a jury trial.1'22 1
Some oppose plea bargaining and complain about the loss of the
virtues inherent in public trials.227 These critics argue that the process
subverts many of the values of the criminal justice system including
the due process standards and proof elements which influence the na-
ture of any plea. 2
28
Other critics argue that criminals benefit from bargaining and
thus "get away" with unduly lenient sentences. 2 9 Statistics somewhat
bear this out-the average prison sentence for a felony conviction fol-
lowing trial is higher than the average felony guilty plea.2 30 While
223. Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's
Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2025 (2000);
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989) ("When the judgment of conviction upon
a guilty plea has become final and the offender seeks to reopen the proceeding, the in-
quiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both counseled and vol-
untary. If the answer is in the affirmative then the conviction and the plea, as a general
rule, foreclose the collateral attack.').
224. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209-10 (1995) (citation and in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
225. Guidorizzi, supra note 219, at 767.
226. Id. at 761 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).
227. Id. at 768 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining De-
bate, 69 CAL. L. REv. 652, 720 (1981)).
228. Id. at 769 (citing Thomas W. Church, In Defense of Bargain Justice, 13 LAW
& SOcY REV. 509, 514-15 (1979)).
229. Id. at 770.
230. Id. at 770 n.117 (CThe average prison sentence following a felony conviction
by jury trial was 190 months while the average sentence following a felony guilty plea
was seventy-two months. The medians also reflect a significant sentencing differential,
108 months followingjury trial and 48 months following a guilty plea.' (citing U.S. DEPT
OF JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTiCE STATISTICS 505 (1995)).
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these statistics support the "get away" with something argument, it is
generally necessary to give concessions in order to secure convictions.
Critics, however, argue that "securing concessions from the prosecutor
perpetuates the image that criminals can evade the law provided they
are willing to bargain" '3 and that "plea bargaining undermines the
deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. 12 32 They maintain that defen-
dants view it as a way to beat the system.133 In response to the public's
apparent "loss of faith" in a system which bargains with criminals,
some policymakers have attempted to "ban" plea bargaining all to-
gether.2 3 None of these bans have been sustained long term.
235
On the other hand, some scholars have argued for years that plea
bargaining is inherently flawed and unfair to defendants.2 36 They ar-
gue that the state's bargaining power is so great that it can coerce in-
nocent defendants into pleading guilty.237 The common criticism is
"that the threat of much harsher penalties after trial is impermissibly
coercive upon the defendants and causes them to abandon the proce-
dural protections of trial. 2 3 The risk of not accepting the plea, going
to trial, and having the prosecutor up the charges 239 is too great a risk
and causes some innocent people to plead guilty. Critics argue that "it
is hypocritical to use 'an elaborate trial process as window dressing,
while doing all the real business of the system through the most un-
elaborate process imaginable." 4 The power imbalance between the
government and the defendant is such that it "renders the plea bar-
231. Id. at 771.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 753-54.
235. Id.; see, e.g., Michael L. Rubinstein et al., The Effect of the Official Prohibi-
tion of Plea Bargaining on the Disposition of Felony Cases in the Alaska Criminal Courts,
in ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING 1, 257-59 (U.S. Government Printing Office 1980).
236. Guidorizzi, supra note 219, at 753.
237. See supra note 205.
238. Blank, supra note 223, at 2016 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
239. Courts refuse to find vindictive prosecution when prosecutor threatens to up
the charges if the defendant does not accept the plea. See, e.g., State v. Tilson, 794 A.2d
465 (R.I. 2002) (holding that in the course of pre-trial plea negotiations, a prosecutor's
threat to recharge the defendant with greater charges should the defendant not plead to
the current lesser charges is not grounds for a finding of vindictive prosecution, even
when the threat is made immediately before trial); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25-
28 (1974) (stating that "by 'upping the ante' through a felony indictment whenever [one]
pursues his statutory appellate remedy--the [government] can insure that only the most
hardy defendants will brave the hazards of a de novo trial").
240. Blank, supra note 223, at 2016 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
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gaining process inaccurate and unfair, especially to poor and unso-
phisticated defendants. 41
In spite of the critics on both sides of the aisle, plea bargaining is
an integral part of our criminal justice system. While it is hard to de-
termine when plea bargaining actually began in this country,2 4 what
is uniformly accepted is that by the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries the use of plea bargaining had become pervasive. 43 By
the 1920s, plea bargaining was an established part of our criminal
justice system. 244 In the 1970 "Brady Trilogy," the Supreme Court held
plea bargains presumptively constitutional so long as defendants en-
ter into them voluntarily and intelligently, and with the assistance of
counsel.2 45 The following year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
commitment to plea bargaining in Santobello v. New York, observing
that plea bargaining is "an essential component of the administration
of justice" that should, when properly administered, be encouraged.2 46
The Court added that plea bargaining "is not only an essential part of
the process but a highly desirable part."247 In a very real sense, plea
bargaining 'is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is
the criminal justice system. '2 4
In spite of the criticisms and concerns, plea bargaining thus ex-
ists and is well-recognized as a central part of the criminal justice
process. Its existence and prevalence follows from its advantages-the
possibility of increasing certainty and efficiency, and offering closure
at the expense of fewer resources.
Moreover, plea bargaining benefits, at least potentially, all with
an interest in a criminal prosecution-the prosecutor, defense coun-
sel, defendant, victims, judiciary, and community. By plea bargaining,
both prosecutor and defense counsel gain greater flexibility in dispos-
ing of their criminal caseloads. Plea bargaining "provides a quick, effi-
cient method of handling a large caseload," allowing the prosecutor
and defense counsel "to concentrate [their] efforts on the more serious
and high profile cases that will be of greater concern to the public. '2 49
241. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
242. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
1 (1979) (noting that some argue that it "has 'always' been with us").
243. Guidorrizzi, supra note 219, at 758-59. For an extensive discussion of the
history of plea bargaining see Alschuler, supra note 243, and Jay Wishingrad, The Plea
Bargain in Historical Perspective, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 499 (1974).
244. Guidorrizzi, supra note 219, at 759.
245. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 796 (1970); McMann v. Richard-
son, 397 U.S. 759, 772 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757-58 (1970).
246. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
247. Id. at 261.
248. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 203, at 1912.
249. Guidorizzi, supra note 219, at 765.
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It provides flexibility regarding resource allocation issues and reduces
the pressures associated with going to trial.2" This is as true for de-
fense counsel as for the prosecution. Public defender offices especially
have scarce resources to handle high caseloads. Yet even among the
private defense bar, "[p]lea bargaining provides an easy compromise
for an attorney to adequately represent her client and still make a liv-
ing."251 Plea bargaining, in other words, fits the need of defense attor-
neys to zealously represent their clients while making wise business
decisions.
Defendants generally receive some charge and sentencing con-
cessions. "Although they lose the chance of an acquittal, defendants
escape the maximum penalties provided by statute while at the same
time 'avoiding the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial.'
2 5 2
Plea bargaining also conserves judicial resources. "A] large num-
ber of plea bargains alleviate congested caseloads and reduce the ex-
pense of providing jury trials. 253 The Supreme Court has stated that
plea bargaining is a highly desirable part of our system because it is
quicker and provides a less expensive way of disposing of criminal
cases.25 It also provides victims with an "immediate sense of closure
along with the knowledge that the defendant will not go unpunished
for the crime. . . avoids the rigors of testifying at trial and the possi-
bility of the prosecution not getting a conviction."25
Criminal case-management mediation embraces all the concerns
and criticisms associated with plea bargaining and waiver of constitu-
tional rights and then ratchets them up to a new level. The defendant
and defense counsel are concerned about fairness and coercion. They
worry about an overly aggressive "nudge from the judge" exacerbating
the already enormous pressure from the prosecutor.256 The prosecutor
is confronted with the public's loss of faith in a process which bargains
with "criminals" coupled with opening the prior private plea bargain-
ing negotiations to the scrutiny of a member of the judiciary. The ju-
dicial mediator faces the potential of a defendant challenging the vol-
untariness of the plea agreement in a subsequent habeas petition and
attempting to disclose confidential mediation communications.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 766.
252. Id. at 766 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)).
253. Id. at 767.
254. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
255. Guidorrizzi, supra note 219, at 767.
256. But see Smith, supra note 3, at 19-20 (arguing that mandatory mediation is
preferable to the "unsupervised negotiation" currently in place as it protects the defen-
dant against "potential discrimination and abuse" of prosecutorial discretion while ensur-
ing that the interests of the public are adequately represented).
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As noted previously, judges should be cognizant of the power of
the robe and the ultimate impact they may have on the defendant's
decision to plead guilty. The attraction of the judicial mediatorknowl-
edge, experience, authority, and persuasiveness, is exactly what
should make judges cautious. Their efforts to help out a fellow judge,
to clear the docket, and to get the settlement could come back to
haunt them. A settlement crafted in the shadows of trial may be
viewed differently in the light of a prison cell. It is easy to envision
the pro se habeas petition alleging that the plea was involuntary as
the judge pressured the defendant into accepting the plea. 57
The process also provides unique advantages and potential to
improve our criminal justice system. Various factors operate to im-
pede settlements and preclude the parties from negotiating a plea
agreement. The most common is that the parties lock themselves into
positions258 and refuse to budge or consider objectively the proposals
being propounded by the other side. 5
Another is the parties' inability to accurately assess the strengths
and weaknesses of the case. Case-management mediation inserts a
neutral third party into the negotiation process and allows the neutral
to help assess the merits of the case and to facilitate a settlement.
The presence of a neutral third person also has the potential of
mollifying an overzealous prosecutor. As some have noted the 'inher-
ent inequalities" between the prosecutor and the defendant have in-
tensified over the past thirty plus years, making the adversary proc-
ess almost obsolete.26 0
One commentator argues that criminal mediation may serve as a
tool to reduce the racial bias inherent in our system.' Plea bargain-
257. It is not beyond the pale to envision the petition-"Judge X made me take
the plea. He said that if I did not agree to the offer that I rot in jail for life." Even if the
prisoner does not prevail, judges are reluctant to have their names splattered throughout
a habeas petition as the cause for the involuntary plea.
258. Positions are an assertion of what one wants; they are the initial and at
times subsequent lines which parties draw delineating acceptable solutions or resolutions
to the dispute. See generally, STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 173-
74 (2001).
259. See generally, CRAVER, supra note 195, at 279 ("Careful and patient concilia-
tion can frequently induce... litigants to reconsider their own underlying needs and in-
terests and to more realistically evaluate the proposals being suggested by their adversar-
ies.").
260. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PIr. L. REV. 393, 395
(1992).
261. See Levine, supra note 36, at 389-99. Concerns about racial bias haunt our
criminal justice system. Statistics on the number of blacks or Latinos in prison bears this
out. Of the 1,976,019 persons incarcerated in adult facilities, 1,239,949 or 63% are black
or Latino. These two groups only comprise twenty-five (25%) of the national population.
See also Human Rights Watch Press Backgrounder, Race and Incarceration in the United
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ing is one of the points in the criminal justice system which is particu-
larly vulnerable to racial bias.2 62 One author argues for the use of me-
diation and arbitration in the plea setting to reduce the racial bias in-
herent in the criminal justice process. 216 She asserts that the prosecu-
tor's unbridled discretion creates the opportunity for bias.2" She ar-
gues that ADR, particularly mediation, is a more collaborative process
and could provide neutrality during the plea process.265 Her argument
assumes the mediator will bring neutrality and objectivity to the
process and that it is the mediator's job to ensure fairness.2 6 All of
this is premised on the prosecutor being the one primarily at fault and
that the insertion of a neutral person can rectify the racial bias inher-
ent in the criminal justice system. If her assertions are correct, then
the argument has value. In this instance, one has to wonder if the ju-
dicial mediator does not in fact also come with his or her own bias.
E. Prosecutor Resistance6 7
Prosecutors in the American criminal justice system play a piv-
otal role in the resolution of cases, and unless they can affirmatively
answer the question about criminal mediation-'"What is in it for
me?"-they cannot be expected to participate voluntarily.
In one of the first seminars of its kind, the University of Idaho's
"Mediating the Criminal Case" seminar, offered in May 2003, asked
participants to describe the role of the prosecutor. Their list included
the following: the gatekeeper; an attorney with no real client; the ul-
timate decision maker; the possessor of the power; one who has the
obligation to do justice; and a wearer of multiple hats.68 These are all
accurate.
States (Feb, 27, 2002), at www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/race. Black males, ages 18-64,
outnumber Caucasian males in prison by a ratio of 7.4 to 1. Id.
262. Andrew Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Dis-
criminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 559 (1998).
263. Levine, supra note 36, at 389-99.
264. Id. at 392 ('The current process of plea-bargains thus leaves much room for
personal, and cumulatively, systematic racial bias.').
265. Id.
266. See supra note 186 (discussing the role of the mediator to ensure fairness).
267. The University of Idaho College of Law offered a two and a half day seminar
during its Northwest Institute for Dispute Resolution in May 2003. Seminar, supra note
7. Although every prosecutor and defense attorney in the northwest was invited, only one
prosecutor attended.
268. Id.; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-1.2 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (describing the
prosecutor's role as "an administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court").
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The prosecutor has a unique role in the American criminal jus-
tice system. It has been said that "[p]rosecutors are the hub of the
criminal justice system." 9 As the gatekeepers of the criminal justice
system, they must "seek justice, not merely to convict,"27 using their
vast power judiciously.2 1 The prosecutors' clients are "an amorphous
entity of the 'people,' 'state,' or 'government."2 7 2 The prosecutor must
balance their multiple roles in a fair and equitable manner. 1 17
The lack of a readily identifiable client results in the prosecutor
having boundless discretion in many ways. 74 Nonetheless, prosecu-
tors must consider many contrasting interests when making deci-
sions.2 75 They do not have the singular purpose of defeating their ad-
versary.27s Because prosecutors are both zealous advocates and seek-
ers of justice, they play a dual role that is quasi-judicial. 77 In the con-
tinuing search for justice, prosecutors act as a judge and fact finder
when they decide who to investigate, who to charge, and who not to
charge. 278 Furthermore, prosecutors must consider their beliefs as to
guilt of the suspect and avoid a presumption favoring a certain out-
269. Lerman, supra note 48, at 1667; see also Stacy Caplow, What if There is No
Client?: Prosecutors as "Counselors" of Crime Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 8 (1998) (dis-
cussing the shift in the role of initiating criminal process from the private prosecutor of
Colonial times where the victim themselves served as the initiators of the criminal proc-
ess to the current public prosecutor system).
270. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 268. In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 87
(1935), the Court noted that the modem prosecutor "is the representative not of an ordi-
nary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a crimi-
nal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."
271. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 268 ("A prosecutor should not permit his or her
own professional judgment or obligations to be affected by his or her own political, finan-
cial, business, property, or personal interests.").
272. Caplow, supra note 269, at 10.
273. Id. at 9 ('The prosecutor balances the often conflicting priorities of the com-
munity, the victim, the defendant, and the judiciary while enforcing legislative goals and
constitutional mandates. Although tempered by office policies and prosecutorial priori-
ties, the individual prosecutor has broad powers and discretion, and operates as a free
agent, making myriad daily judgments and decisions, hopefully in a lawful, ethical, and
honorable fashion.").
274. Id.
275. Green, supra note 131, at 614. The prosecutor's role is twofold: to ensure
that "guilt [shall] not escape or innocence suffer," and to be impartial and nonpartisan. Id.
To fulfill these roles, the prosecutor must "strike hard blows" while avoiding foul ones. Id.
(quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1999)).
276. Green, supra note 131, at 614.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 625 (asserting that the justification for the prosecutor's duty to seekjustice comes from the need to redress the "gross imbalance of power between prosecutors
and defense lawyers").
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come. 279 When they make the above decisions, "doing justice" may be
achieving a just result, not necessarily the most harsh result.20 This
idea runs contrary to prosecutors' win-loss record keeping mentality
which has little to do with justice. 211 It is also at odds with the nation's
desire to see prosecutors as "tough on crime."2 2 Some argue that the
intense media coverage under which many prosecutors operate has
changed them from "champions of justice to advocates of victory."28
Doing justice or seeking justice is thus the main role of the prose-
cutor. Even though it is not specifically defined in rules, this role has
developed over time becoming entrenched in our legal system. In sum,
the prosecutor must not only fight people who break the law, but also
fight against anything that would prove to be an injustice. For this
reason, the prosecutor "retains the trump card in the decision making
process. It is the prosecutor who ultimately makes the charging, plea,
and sentenc[ing] recommendation decisions whether or not the victim
endorses those choices."2
As noted earlier, prosecutors fear giving up control of the crimi-
nal process through the use of mediation. Allowing a neutral third
party into their private negotiations and permitting the victim to at-
tend the mediation sessions potentially gives both the mediator and
the victim a stronger voice in the outcome. Mediation thus potentially
diminishes the power that lies in the unique client-independent, yet
quasi-representational role of the prosecutor.M
Prosecutors also worry that the ultimate sentence coming out of a
mediation may be lower than if the case were to proceed to trial. The
question is whether this concern is well-founded. If a recommended
settlement is lowered during mediation as the parties exchange facts
and the mediator helps the parties assess the strengths and weak-
nesses of case, it is reasonable to assume that a court would likewise
probably lower the sentence after hearing all the evidence. There is,
or at least should be, a correlation between the strength of the case,
279. THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-
3.9(b)(i) (1995); see also Green, supra note 131, at 638.
280. Green, supra note 131, at 614.
281. See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is
How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice For Prose-
cutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 284 (2001) (discussing the power of prosecutors and how
that has affected the role of a win-lose mentality amongst some prosecutors).
282. James McCloskey, The Death Penalty: A Personal View, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
P2, June 22, 1996. The Westlaw citation to this article is 1996 WL 13108692.
283. See JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT 23 (2d ed., Matthew
Bender & Co. 1999).
284. Caplow, supra note 269, at 12.
285. Id.
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the evidence, and the ultimate sentence regardless of how one arrives
at the sentence.
Prosecutors are elected officials and are concerned about the loss
of political capital. At times, the decision on how to charge and plea a
particular case is politically driven. Prosecutors believe that they need
to appear to be "tough on crime" in order remain in office. 28 The per-
ception that criminal mediation is "soft on crime," equates with "po-
litical suicide" despite potential cost-cutting and restorative bene-
fits. 2 7 Politicians know that public perception equates with political
reality when the votes are counted.
Recognizing all the above, the question remains-Why would
prosecutors want to open up their negotiations to "outsiders," risking
intrusion into what is now a fairly unbridled realm of discretion? 28 To
a certain extent, choice over the matter is not within their hands.
Criminal mediation is increasingly taking hold, irrespective of prose-
cutor concerns over threats to their virtual autonomy of the prosecu-
tor.2 9 Criminal mediation is happening and will continue to happen.2 90
Moreover, criminal mediation offers advantages for the prosecu-
tor. Joining the dialogue about criminal mediation and willingly par-
286. Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death
Penalty: The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates' Campaigning on Capital Convictions, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 941, 946-47 (1994) (noting that prosecutors running for office typi-
cally remind voters who they are by referring to notorious cases).
287. See Bakker, supra note 45, at 1506 (Victim offender mediation programs
"may not accommodate a public desire for retribution and punishment. Prisons instill
public confidence; mediation may not.'); Katherine L. Joseph, Victim-Offender Mediation:
What Social & Political Factors Will Affect Its Development?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 207, 219 (1996) ("It is political suicide.., to support a project that is perceived as
soft on crime.").
288. Gershman, supra note 260, at 407-08 (describing the "uncontrolled discre-
tion" of prosecutors); Guidorizzi, supra note 219, at 756 (noting 'judges seldom reject plea
bargaining agreements involving sentencing recommendations by the prosecutor').
289. See Kaczor, supra note 200 (District Attorney Kevin Meenan, of Casper,
Wyoming, "the immediate past president of the national prosecutors group, called the
King case 'an aberration. It's a unique circumstance, and I'd be very surprised if there
was a subsequent flood of mediations.".
290. While there is no empirical data on this topic, the response after the King
brothers' mediation is instructive. Bill Eddins, the Pensacola lawyer who served as the
mediator for the King brothers' case, spoke positively of the process, stating: "Our justice
system in America will have to look at the mediation process." Kaczor, supra note 200. He
noted that mediation "eliminates expense" and "uncertainty, and I'd like to think in this
case we reached an agreement that was in the best interest of both the state and the de-
fense." Id. Miami lawyer and past president of the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers, Jeffrey S. Weiner, spoke positively about the use of mediation to help re-
solve criminal cases after the King brothers' case was successfully mediated. Id. "It's so
beneficial that it should be available to virtually everyone in every case when negotiation
with the state attorney doesn't work." Id. He further stated, "It's a no-lose situation. It
would save millions of dollars across the country." Id. But see supra note 289 (prosecutor's
response).
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ticipating in the process presents some distinct advantages for prose-
cutors. First and foremost, if prosecutors wish to have a voice in the
development of this process, they must join the dialogue before it is
forced upon them without input. Their voice could make the process
more conducive to prosecutors and responsive to their concerns. Fur-
thermore, prosecutors have a self interest in the growth and use of
mediation in particular cases.
The insertion of a third party neutral into certain failed plea ne-
gotiations could be incredibly beneficial to the prosecutor. Mediation
presents new opportunities to resolve cases which "should settle." For
example, when a defendant will not listen to defense counsel, a well
respected criminal mediator could assist with client control and aid
the client's ability to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the case.
Similarly, it could benefit the prosecutor if the defense attorney is ei-
ther too inexperienced or too arrogant to recognize a reasonable offer.
In addition, mediation could save the prosecutor money. Prosecutors'
offices are financially strapped"' and may welcome reprieve from a
potentially lengthy and costly trial. Furthermore, the victim's buy in
during mediation may help insulate the prosecutor and defuse claims
of being soft on crime. Thus prosecutors have a self-interest in the ex-
pansion of the process.
F. Lack of Effective Privilege Rule
While an in-depth discussion of mediation privilege is beyond the
scope of this article, it would be imprudent not to briefly discuss the
need for a sound privilege rule as a significant concern in the criminal
context. States which are using criminal mediation no less than civil
mediation to resolve cases need to look at mediation privilege rules
and determine whether they adequately protect the process and the
parties.
While some states such as Florida, California, and Texas have
comprehensive ADR mediation programs and have already seriously
studied the issue of privilege, not all states have such developed privi-
lege rules.292 Since criminal mediation is taking root, states must de-
291. In February 2004, the Whitman County Prosecutor in Washington State
dropped charges against a man who failed to deliver the purchased products from an
eBay sale "in the interest of justice and judicial economy." The cost of prosecuting the
case was too high. Ron Marose, Prosecutor Drops Charges Against WSU Student,
MOSCOW-PULLMAN DAILY NEWS, Feb. 21-22, 2004, at 8A; Craig Clohessy, Changes
Needed to Prosecute Net Cases, MOSCOW-PULLMAN DAILY NEWS, Feb. 25, 2004, at 7A
("Whitman County Prosecutor ... dropped prosecution of a case based on money.').
292. See UMA, supra note 33, at prefatory note 3 ("Importance of Uniformity)
("irtually all States have adopted some form of privilege, reflecting a strong public policy
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termine which mediation communications should be protected and
ensure that all mediators, including judicial mediators, are bound by
confidentiality. Mediators' assertions that all mediation communica-
tions are confidential can be misleading especially in the criminal
arena. 93 Mediators, lawyers, and their clients must know the limits of
any existing mediation privilege rules and whether they apply to
criminal cases.29
4
IV. CONCLUSION
Certain serious concerns accompany the growing popularity of
case-management criminal mediation. The aim of this article has been
to begin the dialogue regarding some of those concerns. It is impor-
tant that the dialogue for criminal mediation continue, despite the
need for caution.
Courts generally favor settlements in both the civil and the
criminal arena, and for similar reasons. Settlements are less resource
intensive, reduce litigation, provide certainty and closure, and lessen
the costs for the courts and the parties.295 In the criminal context,
favoring confidentiality in mediation. However, this policy is effected through more than
250 different state statutes. Common differences among these statutes include the defini-
tion of mediation, subject matter of the dispute, scope of protection, exceptions, and the
context of the mediation that comes within the statute (such as whether the mediation
takes place in a court or community program or a private setting)."); Id. at prefatory note
4 ("Ripeness of a Uniform Law") (noting that half of the States have adopted general ap-
plication privilege rules); see generally Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transition
from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Me-
diation Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (1995)
(providing a comprehensive overview of mediation privilege).
293. Case law in this area is sparse yet instructive on the critical role mediation
rules play in the mediation process. See e.g. State v. Trejo, 979 P.2d 1230 (Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that wife's statement in a child custody mediation, "I want to see him six feet
under," is not privilege in subsequent criminal case because wife is not a party in the
criminal matter); State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to
quash the subpoena of a mediator from a neighborhood dispute resolution program when
the accused claimed that threats made during the mediation would support his claim of
self defense); Williams v. State, 342 S.E. 2d 703 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)(holding that an em-
ployee's privately negotiated settlement agreement admitting that she had taken money
and agreeing to repay her former employer $60,000 was admissible in her subsequent
criminal trial); Bryd v. State, 367 S.E. 2d 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the media-
tion agreement from the Neighborhood Justice Center was inadmissible in a subsequent
criminal case).
294. See Kirtley, supra note 292, at 29 (noting, "[m]ediation privileges which do
not apply to criminal cases are inconsistent with traditional privileges and produce a
chilling effect upon mediation discussions'); UMA, supra note 33, at Prefatory Note 3,
Importance of uniformity and Note 4, Ripeness of a uniform law (discussing the value of
uniformity for mediators and participants).
295. JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A
NUTISHELL 49 (2d ed. 2001) (citing these as generally recognized principles). In response
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courts, governments, prosecutors, and public defenders expend fewer
public resources when cases settle before trial. Moreover, mediators
can assist the parties in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of
their cases. From the recalcitrant, unreasonable defendant to the
overzealous prosecutor, mediation gives the parties and the attorneys
a dry run with an experienced judge or lawyer who can provide a dose
of reality. It also brings with it the advantages of plea bargaining,
such as closure, certainty, cost savings, and the minimization of me-
dia coverage in high-profile cases.
Nonetheless, mediating criminal cases bespeaks caution for all
involved-the judicial mediator, the prosecutor, the defendant, and
the defense attorney."9 6 Saving money and judicial efficiency cannot
be allowed to erode the defendants' constitutional protections. 7
Prosecutors must be assured that the process will provide benefits
worth the loss of control they face. Moreover, considerations of confi-
dentiality and privilege must be addressed. Amidst the haste to settle
cases and clear dockets, it is also critical to seriously think about the
objectives and methods of criminal mediation. Is criminal mediation
potentially a fluid alternative to the adversarial process, or does it
simply short-circuit the process? Are there lessons to learn from more
established mediation settings, particularly civil mediation and re-
storative programs, that should be studied before states run headlong
into encouraging criminal mediation?
As in the civil context, mediators in the criminal context must re-
ceive mediation training. Judge-mediators must understand the criti-
cal importance of setting aside their adjudicative skills when they
transform from judge to mediator. Additionally, judges need to be
cognizant of the power of the robe, and the ultimate impact then may
have on a defendant's decision to plead guilty. The attraction of the
judicial mediator who possesses knowledge, experience, authority,
and persuasiveness, is exactly what should make judges cautious
about blindly or even nobly entering into the process.
to Idaho's proposed Criminal Mediation Rule, the Idaho Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers ("IACDL") wrote, 'The use of mediation in criminal cases presents new opportu-
nities to resolve cases in a timely manner and reduce court dockets." Letter from Andrew
Parnes, Vice-President of IACDL, to Cathy Derden, Staff Attorney, Idaho Supreme Court,
(Dec. 28, 2001) (on file with author).
296. See Imbrogno, supra note 36, at 706 ('The use of ADR in the criminal law
context is among the most controversial uses of ADR.').
297. See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Why Should Courts Offer Nonbinding ADR
Services?, 16 ALTERNATIVES To HIGH COST LITIG. 65, 76 (arguing that "programs that are
designed by persons whose primary concern is docket reduction could pose serious threats
to... values that ADR should be promoting').
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In many ways, criminal case-management mediation is the logi-
cal extension of a failed plea bargaining process. If a neutral third
person can help break an impasse without exerting extensive control
over the outcome, criminal mediation presents a positive addition to
the dispute resolution processes. If the process simply allows a judi-
cial mediator to clear a calendar by strong-arming a defendant into
accepting a plea, then the process must stop. Heavily evaluative me-
diation allows judges to revert to the skills they know best-deciding
disputes. The purpose of mediation, however, is to let the parties de-
cide the outcome without undue pressure from the "neutral."
Another downside to evaluative case-management style media-
tion is that it subverts the healing potential of mediation. Case-
management mediation with its narrow focus on settlement and clear-
ing court calendars misses an important opportunity for healing. In
this respect, case-management mediators could learn something from
the restorative justice community. Restorative mediation offers a
creative and proven workable alternative to the retributive approach
to dealing with crime. Yet as long as case-management mediation
serves the function of judicial settlement conferencing and is seen as
simply a mechanism to settle more cases, it appears to merely substi-
tute one form of retributive justice for the next. The focus remains
harm to the State without reflection on the entire criminal justice sys-
tem. The question is whether more should be expected of the develop-
ing case-management process, i.e., whether it should be viewed as an
important opportunity to refocus our criminal justice system away
from retribution to restoration and healing.
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